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Political Judges and Popular Justice:  
A Conservative Victory or a Conservative Dilemma? 
 
George D. Brown∗
 
 
Introduction 
What follows is a polemic on the transformation of the American 
judiciary.  It is aimed at conservatives, for they are the driving force in the 
movement to make campaigns for judicial offices exactly like campaigns for 
other “political” offices.  I seek to establish, as a matter of policy, that 
conservative principles argue for a presumption against politicization.  With 
this policy perspective in place, I then examine the law concerning elected 
judges, focusing on the Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White,1  the major victory for what is currently viewed as the 
conservative position.  I argue that White rests on flawed premises and 
should be narrowly construed.   
 Most of the judges in America are elected.2 Yet the institution of the 
elected judiciary is in trouble, perhaps in crisis.3 The pressures of 
campaigning, particularly raising money, have produced an intensity of 
electioneering that many observers see as damaging to the institution itself.4  
It is true that states with elected judges have had in place mechanisms to 
regulate judicial elections, what candidates say and how they raise money, 
for example.  However, these mechanisms – based on the American Bar 
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct5  – have increasingly been 
invalidated by the courts.6  Obviously, governmental regulation of political 
activities raises serious First Amendment problems, particularly in the 
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context of elections where, the Supreme Court has said, the Amendment has 
its fullest and most urgent application.7
 Although this development predates it,8 the Supreme Court decision 
in White gave enormous momentum to the attack on the Canons and the state 
rules derived from them.9   The Court, by a majority of five to four, struck 
down Minnesota’s Announce Clause, which stated that a judicial candidate 
shall not “announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”10  
Since White the Canons have been under siege.  A familiar pattern has 
emerged.  The challenges are brought by conservative candidates and 
groups, often represented by prominent conservative lawyer, James Bopp.11 
The state judicial establishment, bar associations and reformers line up on 
the other side, either as parties or amici.  The battles bear a close 
resemblance to those fought over campaign finance reform.  Indeed, the 
issues coalesce, with conservatives rallying under the First Amendment 
banner in tones that evoke the strong dissents of Justices Scalia and Thomas 
in campaign finance cases.12  The challengers have argued, in essence, that 
states cannot have it both ways.  If states choose to “tap the energy and the 
legitimizing power of the democratic process,”13 they must accord judicial 
candidates the full panoply of the First Amendment protections that would 
apply to all other elections.  As Justice Kennedy put it, “[A] state cannot opt 
for an elected judiciary and then assert that its democracy, in order to work 
as desired, compels the abridgement of speech.”14 For the challengers, 
defenders of the Canons are trying to prevent the politicization of politics, 
like King Canute trying to hold back the sea.  
 In this article, I present an alternative conservative position.15  My 
policy arguments are based in federalism, certainly a bedrock conservative 
doctrine.  The starting premise is that conservatives have a substantial stake 
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in the health and vitality of the state courts.  Doctrines of judicial federalism 
are central to concepts of federalism in general, and those doctrines rest on 
the notion of parity16—particularly the view that state courts are equally as 
capable as the “independent” federal judiciary of providing fair trials and 
protecting individual rights.  State courts play a fundamental role in the 
American Constitutional order.  If the election of state judges has somehow 
reached a point that threatens the capability of state courts, the entire 
conceptual framework of judicial federalism is placed in doubt.   
 Two other aspects of federalism are invoked.  The first is the 
importance of the states’ ability to structure their institutions.  As Justice 
O’Connor stated, “it is in the manner that a state structures its government 
that it defines itself as a sovereign.” 17  There is little dispute, at least so far, 
that states can choose to have elected judges.18  Yet both the majority and 
dissenting opinion in White clearly view those with whom they disagree as 
seeking to undermine the institution.19
 The second federalism question is how far states can experiment in 
the manner of selection. Judicial selection, with its complex issues of law 
and policy, is an ideal area for states to fulfill their laboratory role.  How to 
reconcile the elected judiciary and the values of accountability, with rule of 
law values, particularly the need to afford litigants due process, is one of the 
fundamental questions facing the American legal system.  Pre-White, state 
regulation of judicial elections permitted different approaches to calibrating 
the values.  After White, the road seems open for the challengers to achieve a 
single, nationwide model:  a politicized judiciary that is, essentially, another 
political branch.  Beyond both federalism points is the importance of public 
perception of the state judiciaries as viable entities.  Perception and 
symbolism play an important role in federalism debates: particularly in the 
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recurring question whether states are inferior entities, or co-equal sovereigns 
with the national government.20   
 Law trumps policy, of course, assuming for purposes of argument that 
the distinction is clean cut.   White represents “the law,” but the decision is 
seriously flawed as well as sharply divided.  The majority virtually ignored 
fundamental precepts of separation of powers in treating the judiciary as a 
political branch because it (sometimes) makes policy.21   The dissenters did 
not have an easy time either, relying on the troubling distinction between 
political and nonpolitical elections.   
The questions raised by the politicization debate are not easy ones.  
Indeed, I think the debate would benefit if participants recognized just how 
hard these questions are.  They include the following:   
♦ Can states “square the circle:” can they choose an elected 
judiciary while conducting the elections in a manner that makes it 
look like an appointed one? 
 
♦ Should White be broadly read, to the point of invalidating all 
Canon-based regulation of judicial elections? 
 
♦ Can there be a distinction between political and nonpolitical 
elections, or does the First Amendment apply with equal force in 
all contexts?  In other words, can differences in the offices to be 
chosen lead to different degrees of regulation? 
 
♦  If the answer is potentially yes, just how different is the 
judicial function from that of legislation? Is it minimal in that 
they both make policy, or great in that adjudication/application of 
law is fundamentally different from legislative making of law? 
What about the fact that legislators have constituencies, while 
judges, in theory, do not? 
 
♦ Of what relevance is the contention that choosing an 
adjudicator is a political act, but the process of adjudication is 
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not?  Can it be said that judges derive their legitimacy from the 
office itself, not from their mode of selection?  
 
♦ In our constitutional system, what, if any, are the limits of  
popular control of the judiciary through the electoral process?  Is 
a point reached at which the due process rights of litigants or the 
ability of courts to protect minorities are threatened? 
 
♦ Does the practice of campaign contributions from potential 
parties also threaten due process?  How can a campaign be run 
without money, assuming no public financing? 
 
 What follows can best be viewed as a concept paper.22   My focus is 
not on whether a particular regulation is valid, but rather on whether any 
regulation is valid.  My main target audience is legal conservatives, 
particularly those who view post-White developments as a long overdue 
removal of impediments to democracy in the area of judicial selection.  I 
think the conservative position should be far more nuanced, based on a sense 
of the constitutional role of state courts, as well as the constitutional rights of 
state court candidates.  There is always a risk in attempting to juxtapose 
structural, seemingly abstract values, such as federalism and separation of 
powers, with the concrete rights of those who, for example, wish to 
campaign.  But there is another group of rightholders very much in the 
picture: those who must appear before those candidates once they become 
judges, and whose personal rights to due process must also be considered.  
Perhaps this debate is an example of the scenario envisaged by Justice 
Breyer in an important campaign finance opinion: one where important 
constitutional interests lie on both sides of the equation.23  In any event, I 
have chosen to write at a high level of generality in the hope of moving the 
debate toward some agreement on the range of interests at stake.   
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 Section I of the article focuses on the current “problems” created by 
state judicial elections, and asks whether they are in fact problems or the 
normal play of the democratic process.  Special attention is paid to campaign 
contributions and to public opinion surveys that identify these contributions 
as fostering a negative perception of the state courts.  Section II makes the 
case for conservative concern about the health of state courts and about the 
bearing of federalism arguments on state judicial elections.  This section 
posits the presumption against politicization.  Section III develops possible 
conservative rebuttals to the presumption – both in the domain of law and of 
policy.  This section also presents an analysis and critique of White.  Section 
IV examines what the post-White world of judicial elections might look like.  
It considers alternative scenarios, and recommends one which contains some 
degree of regulation as well as a second generation of judicial campaign 
measures.   
 
I. The Transformation of the American Judiciary –  Is it Real? Is it a 
Problem?  
 
 We may well be witnessing a transformation of the American 
Judiciary, at least in the thirty-nine states that use some form of election to 
choose at least some of their judges.24   Whether this sea change is a problem 
is the subject of intense debate, but there is no disagreement that it is 
happening.  Judicial elections are becoming increasingly like elections to 
legislative and executive offices.  As one critical observer puts it, “disturbing 
trends documented in recent years include a staggering escalation of the 
money used to support judicial campaigns, a growth in the participation of 
political parties and other interest groups in judicial campaigns, increases in 
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the amount of television advertising, [and] a deterioration in the tone of 
campaigns ...”25   In other words, we are witnessing the “politicization”26 of 
judicial campaigns.  My goal in this part is to examine and elaborate on the 
phenomenon as a prelude to the argument that conservatives should be 
troubled by it.   
 
A.  Politicization – The New Judicial Campaigns. 
 Consider three aspects of the trend.  The first is the tendency of 
candidates to run touting advertisements – emphasizing not only their 
qualifications but also their positions.  Examples include ads such as 
“Maximum Marion Bloss. You do the crime, you do the time,”27 or 
declarations that a candidate is pro-life and for “traditional marriage,” 28 or 
that she is the only candidate who has put “thousands of criminals behind 
bars.”29
 A second, often remarked, phenomenon is the rise of negative ads, 
many paid for by independent, or “special interest” groups.30  According to 
one study, negative ads accounted for one-fifth of all ads in 2004, twice the 
rate of the previous election cycle.31   The recent Republican primary in the 
Alabama race for Chief Justice featured remarkable negative advertising 
from both candidates.  The following is a description of exchanges between 
challenger Tom Parker and sitting Chief Justice Drayton Nabers:  
 One spat occurred in April of 2006, when the late Supreme 
Court Justice Hugo Black was inducted into the Alabama Lawyers 
Hall of Fame.  Parker used the event to lambaste Nabers, a former law 
clerk of Black’s.  He distributed a diatribe at the ceremony, which 
stated that “[Black’s induction was] a shameful disgrace to the people 
of Alabama,” and that Black “personally launched the war to kick 
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God out of the public square in America.”  In an attempt to solidify 
his conservative credentials, Nabers released a television 
advertisement in which he stated that he is conservative, pro-life, and 
will always support traditional marriage.  Parker responded with an ad 
of his own, questioning Nabers’ stances on the aforementioned issues, 
and calling Nabers “too liberal, too wrong for Alabama.”  In another 
ad, Parker targeted the issue of gay marriage.  While spooky music is 
played, the viewer is informed that a “liberal judge” in Georgia had 
recently thrown out the state’s same-sex marriage ban.  An image of 
two homosexual men dressed in tuxedos appears on the screen as the 
announcer asks, “Is Alabama next?”  He answers the question, 
“Maybe! Chief Justice Drayton Nabers and a liberal state court 
majority say they will back all federal court orders—even one 
ordering Alabama to recognize gay marriages!”  In another ad, Paker 
takes aim on a court decision which took a convicted rapist and 
murderer off death row.  Once again, music worthy of a horror film is 
played, and a black-and-white image of a hand holding a knife is 
displayed on the screen.  Then, a less-than-flattering image of Nabers 
appears next to a French flag, then a Mexican flag and a United 
Nations flag, and the viewer is informed that Nabers and the Alabama 
Supreme Court used foreign law to overturn the death sentence of this 
convicted murderer.32
 
 The aspect of politicization that has received the most attention from 
academics and other observers33 is the dramatic increase in the amount of 
money spent on judicial elections.  Writing in 1985, Professor Schotland 
stated that “we have the spectacle of judges during campaign season 
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receiving not just checks but even cash at public gatherings, and we have an 
increasing spate of news articles about funding in judicial campaigns.”34  
The trend continues.  As the National Law Journal put it:  “Running for state 
judge has never been pricier.”35 Statistics abound.  According to the New 
York Times, “Spending . . . is skyrocketing, with some judges raising $2 
million or more for a single campaign.”36  In 2006, the most expensive 
judicial race in the country was the aforementioned election of Alabama’s 
chief justice.  The three candidates raised 8.2 million dollars.37   However, 
the most expensive race remains that for a seat in the Illinois Supreme Court 
in 2004.  The two candidates spent 9.3 million dollars.38
 An extremely helpful source of information on money in judicial 
elections is the periodic reports by the Justice at Stake Campaign (JAS): a 
Washington-based reform group.39  Given the group’s reform orientation, 
one may question its ultimate conclusions about the current state of judicial 
campaigns, but its compilation of data is indispensable for those studying the 
issue.  Here are two excerpts from the 2004 study: 
More Fundraising in More States.  In 2003-2004, candidates 
combined to raise over $46.8 million.  In the past three cycles, 
candidates have raised $123 million, compared to $73.5 million in the 
three cycles prior.  Nine states broke candidate fundraising records in 
the 2003-2004 cycle.   
 
Average Cost of Winning Jumps 45 Percent in Two Years.  In 2004, 
the average amount raised by winners in the 43 races in which 
candidates raised any money leapt to $651,586 from $450,689 in 
2002.  Average fundraising among all candidates who raised money 
climbed to $434,289.40   
 
The JAS Report on 2006 sounds many of the same themes, referring 
to 2006 as “the most threatening year yet to the fairness of America’s state 
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courts.”  41  JAS notes increased spending, including the fact that “[o]f the 10 
states that had entirely privately financed contested Supreme Court 
campaigns in 2006, five . . . set state records for candidate fundraising in a 
single court race, as well as records for total fundraising by all high court 
candidates.”42   
The Report also expresses concern over vitriolic negative 
advertisements,43  and the spread of politicization to intermediate and trial 
courts.44    However, it is not all negative.  Indeed, it suggests the potential 
for self-correction within the system:  
In 2006 judicial candidates who sought to put disputed political and 
legal issues at the center of their candidacy lost more often than they 
won.  In state after state, when judicial campaigns began to sound like 
politics as usual, many voters seemed wary.45
 
March 2007 marked a further escalation of the politicization of 
judicial campaigns.  A newly-formed group—The Democratic Judicial 
Campaign Committee—entered the fray with a resounding broadside.46   
Declaring itself “the only organization whose primary mission is to elect 
Democrats to state courts,”47 the DJCC declared that  
Beginning in the early 1990’s, political consultants such as Karl Rove 
have orchestrated the conservative takeover of our state courts.  These 
efforts have been funded by large contributions from corporate 
interests.  Today, Republicans control 39 of 63 seats on courts with 
partisan elections.  If these judges remain on the bench, consumers’ 
and workers’ rights, environmental protections, and the opportunity 
for individual citizens to find justice in our court system will continue 
to disappear.  The DJCC fights against this right-wing insurgency to 
restore justice and democracy to our nation’s court systems.48
 
The DJCC described the Republican-backed judges in the following 
terms: “They are often unqualified for the office, ignorant of the law of their 
state, unconcerned with the facts of the cases before them, dismissive of 
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lower court rulings, and without concern for their own professional 
reputation or the appearance of a biased court.  In short, these judges are 
bought and paid for by the corporations who funded their campaigns.”49   It 
is too early to tell how much the emergence of such a group is a step towards 
treating state court races as part of the national political picture – perhaps on 
a par with tallies of how many governorships have gone to which parties.  
The DJCC is quick to point out that national conservative interest groups are 
already active players.  It seems fair, however, to characterize the 
development as an escalation of the rhetoric surrounding judicial campaigns.    
In sum, the politicization of judicial elections shows every sign of 
increasing to the point where the elections, and perhaps the judiciary itself, 
are transformed.  As Professor James Gibson put it,  
The confluence of broadened freedom for judges to speak out on 
issues, the increasing importance of state judicial policies, and the 
infusion of money into judicial campaign have produced what may be 
described as the “Perfect Storm” of judicial elections.  This storm is 
radically reshaping the atmosphere of state judicial elections as it 
gathers strength and spreads across the nation.50    
 
This situation is a marked contrast to the phenomenon, which prevailed until 
recently, of low visibility, low salience elections.51   Part of the explanation 
is no doubt the spread to the judicial arena of practices found in every other 
type of American election.  In the judicial context, however, there is an 
additional explanation:  the removal of barriers erected to prevent this very 
phenomenon.  
 
B. The Fall of the Canons and the Rise of the Challengers. 
 The American Bar Association has, over the years, promulgated codes 
regulating judicial conduct including conduct in elections.52   States 
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gradually adopted most or all of the ABA’s Canons of Judicial Ethics (the 
Canons) to the point that they became the dominant source of governance of 
judicial elections.  The Canons cover such matters as forbidding making 
“commitments” or “pledges or promises” about a candidate’s views,53 and 
financial aspects of a campaign including a prohibition on direct solicitation 
of funds by candidates.54  Obviously the Canons, or more precisely the state 
rules adopting them in a binding fashion, (generally adopted by State high 
courts) operated to prevent the politicization described here.  That was their 
goal.55   At the same time, however, they had a direct, negative effect on 
candidate speech, thus raising serious First Amendment questions.   
 Even before the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White56 successful challenges were mounted.57   White, 
discussed in more detail in Part III,58  relied on the First Amendment to 
strike down a Minnesota rule forbidding a judicial candidate to “announce 
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”59   The majority left 
the question open,60 but suggested that “judicial and legislative elections”61 
might be governed by the same constitutional rules.62  White was clearly 
seen by many potential challengers of the Canons to have precisely that 
effect.  Their challenges have often succeeded, particularly in federal 
courts.63
 The challenge to the Canons has a distinctly conservative flair.  
Justice Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion in White, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas, Kennedy and O’Connor.64  The latter two 
justices also wrote concurring opinions, while joining in the Court’s 
opinion.65  Justices Stevens and Ginsburg each wrote a dissent, joined by the 
other members of the Court’s “liberal” wing.66  The challengers themselves 
are primarily conservative candidates and groups67 whose complaints stress 
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a desire to inject conservative views and subjects into judicial elections.68    
As developed in Section III, the challengers’ motives include the concern 
that these views may be excluded under the Canons, and the conviction that 
greater popular exposure to where candidates stand will move the law in a 
conservative direction.69  What has developed then, is a debate between two 
groups that I will call the ABA establishment reformers (reformers) on the 
one hand, and the First Amendment absolutist challengers (challengers) on 
the other.70   In order to develop my thesis on how conservatives ought to 
view the issue, it is necessary to examine briefly the debate and some 
underlying assumptions.  
 
C.  Is Politicization Bad? 
 The position of the reformers rests on a central premise: the manner in 
which judicial campaigns are conducted affects the subsequent operation and 
perception of the judiciary.  As a general matter, it is easy to characterize the 
reformers as mired in a nineteenth-century conception of the law as a 
gentleman’s profession, and the operation of the judiciary as all that is good 
and noble in that conception.  Thus they want judicial elections – which they 
regard as a necessary evil, at best – to reflect that image.  However, I think 
that their main point is that for the judiciary to perform properly, it must be 
kept separate from the hurly-burly, rough-and-tumble world of politics.  The 
ideal figure of the judge is a neutral, somewhat distant individual.71   From 
this perception there flows a more general concept of judging:  judges apply 
the law, in a neutral fashion.  When they do make law their actions are 
subject to constraints such as formalized presentation adversdrial precedent 
– they are not legislators.72
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 The Canons dealing with elections reflect two primary concerns.  The 
first, exemplified by the prohibitions on pledges and promise,73 is that 
judges should strive to avoid committing themselves in advance to particular 
results.  There is a double danger: injustice and the appearance of injustice.  
A second concern, exemplified by the prohibition of direct solicitation,74 is 
that money will taint the judicial process.  Judges may favor, or appear to 
favor, those who have helped put them on the bench.75
 In evaluating these concerns and the support they provide for the 
reformers one must ask whether they flow from informed common sense or 
whether there is actual evidence that the practices the reformers decry do 
hurt the judicial process and/or the perception thereof.  In the case of 
campaign contributions, there is substantial evidence that a problem exists.  
Professor Gibson reports the results of a recent empirical study as follows: 
“the strongest effects on institutional legitimacy come from campaign 
contributions.  When groups with direct connections to the decision maker 
give contributions, legitimacy suffers substantially.”76   Numerous public 
opinions polls reach similar conclusions.  For example, a Marist Institute 
poll conducted in New York in 2003 concluded that, “Eighty-three percent 
of registered voters in the state indicate that having to raise money for 
election campaigns has at least some influence on the decisions made by 
judges.”77   A 1999 national poll for the National Center for State Courts 
found that “slightly over 75% of the respondents agreed that having to raise 
campaign funds influences elected judges.”78   In a Pennsylvania survey the 
figures reached 95 percent.79   Perhaps most disturbing is a recent New York 
Times analysis of campaign contributions and the Ohio Supreme Court.80  It 
suggests empirical support for the intuitive conclusion in the surveys – Ohio 
justices voted in favor of contributors seventy percent of the time.81
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 But is there a problem?  The same surveys show a relatively high 
overall degree of confidence in the courts.82   The doubts raised by campaign 
finance practices are likely to increase – especially given clear evidence that 
more money is being spent on judicial campaigns.83   However, any 
connection between campaign pronouncements and justice or the appearance 
thereof may be harder to prove.  Professor Gibson reports that “Perhaps the 
single most important finding of this paper is that candidates for judicial 
office can engage in policy debates with their opponents without 
undermining the legitimacy of courts and judges.”84   The challengers would 
rush to say that this proves their point: that judicial electioneering is just as 
normal and healthy as electioneering in any other context.  Moreover, there 
is substantial evidence of public support for retaining the elected judiciary.85
 Perhaps the sky has not fallen, at least not yet.86   Things can change, 
however.87  Indeed Professor Gibson concludes his study – the focus of 
which is on the institutional legitimacy of courts – with the following 
warning: “Those concerned about threats to the legitimacy of the elected 
state courts would do well to turn their attention away from substantive 
policy pronouncements and focus instead on the corrosive effects of 
politicized campaigning.”88   However, drawing the line between 
“substantive policy pronouncements” and “politicized campaigning” is not 
always easy.  Dissenting in White Justice Ginsburg raised due process 
concerns in noting the “grave danger to litigants from campaign promises.89  
She also expressed broader concerns about politicized judicial campaigns:   
  “The perception of that unseemly quid pro-quo – a judicial  
  candidate’s  promises on issues in return for the electorate’s  
  votes at the polls – inevitably diminishes the public’s faith in  
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  the ability of judges to administer the law without regard to  
  personal or political self-interest.”90
 
Whether one calls it “electioneering,” “politicization” or something else, 
there is a real risk that the kind of campaigning for judicial seats that we see 
today will only go in one direction – towards a similarity of campaigns for 
all offices that will obscure what makes the judiciary different.  And that is a 
problem.  In saying this, I accept the reformers’ premise that the nature of 
campaigns can affect the operation of the institution and the way it is 
perceived.   
 Indeed, one of the fundamental questions in the whole debate is 
whether it is only about regulating elections, not about regulating the 
judiciary.  Was the Eight Circuit right when it said, in upholding a challenge 
to two Minnesota Canons, “This case... is not about what happens after an 
election”?91   Perhaps there is an oversimplification in the challengers’ 
apparent assumption that “anything goes” is good.  This need not mean 
automatic acceptance of the reformers’ solutions.92    My point is that current 
developments are cause for concern, at least as much for conservatives as 
for any other group.  Conservatives need to take a hard look at the 
developing situation in the state courts, and ask if it is a salutary 
development.  I say this because there are grounds to justify worrying about 
the health of those courts, and the health of the state courts is central to 
conservative visions of judicial federalism.  Moreover, every time a court 
strikes down a state regulation of judicial campaigns, it strikes at the heart of 
the state’s ability to “define itself as a sovereign” and its efforts to find the 
elusive balance between accountability (election of judges) and the role of 
law (fair adjudication).93 The First Amendment is not the only constitutional 
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value in play.  Indeed, important structural concerns based in federalism 
coupled with the basic due process rights of individuals to fair adjudication, 
suggest that the presumption, for conservatives as for others, should be in 
favor of efforts to prevent politicization of the state courts.  
 
II. Federalism and the State Courts – A Presumptive Conservative Position 
Against Politicization 
 Let us proceed on the assumption that politicization at least puts in 
question the viability of the state courts.  Public perception of them as above 
the battle and places where all citizens can receive impartial justice may 
falter.  Extensive campaign promises and political debts may lead to 
prejudgment.  Campaign contributions, in particular, may create a class of 
favored litigants.  Suppose that both citizens in general and close observers 
of the legal system lose confidence in the state courts.  Why would such a 
situation be of particular concern to conservatives? 
 
A.  Judicial Federalism – The Parity Debate94
 A recurring theme in the debates governing federal jurisdiction is that 
state courts are just as capable of vindicating federal rights as federal courts.  
This premise of parity underlines decisions concerning such diverse subjects 
as abstention,95 habeas corpus,96  and, to some degree, the Eleventh 
Amendment.97  Several points require emphasis in the context of this article.  
The first is that parity-based doctrines are of great practical significance in 
the day-to-day operation of the state courts.  They prevent, or limit, federal 
court interference with state court proceedings at both the initial stage and 
the post-trial stage.98   These doctrines frequently raise the question whether 
the state courts can police the officials of their own governments.99   They 
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sometimes send litigants to state courts despite their desire to be in a federal 
forum.100
 Equally important is a second aspect of these doctrines: their 
symbolism.  Perhaps the most famous statement of the symbolic element of 
parity-based doctrines is Justice Black’s evocation of “Our Federalism” in 
Younger v. Harris.101  The symbol is that of a co-equal court system, just as 
one broader vision of federalism depicts the federal and state governments 
generally as co-equal sovereigns.102  Indeed, the doctrines reflect a 
fundamental assumption underlying the judicial system as a whole:  that 
state courts are equal partners with federal courts in the enforcement of 
federal law generally.  Narrow rules concerning when a case “arises under” 
federal law103 may prevent cases presenting significant federal issues from 
being brought in or removed to a federal court.  They are heard in state 
courts, an allocation of authority that reflects, in part, a belief that the two 
systems are of equal competence.  In the realm of constitutional rights, 
Professor Paul Bator stressed the role of state courts as protectors of those 
rights.  He spoke of  
The importance of creating and maintaining conditions that assure 
that, in the long run, the state courts will be respected and equal 
partners with the lower federal courts in the enterprise of formulating 
and enforcing federal constitutional principles. . . We must never 
forget that under our constitutional structure it is the state, and not the 
lower federal, courts that constitute our ultimate guarantee that a 
usurping legislature and executive cannot strip us of our constitutional 
rights.104
 
There is, of course, the competing vision, particularly with respect to 
the enforcement of constitutional rights.  As Professors Solimine and Walker 
note, “Skeptics of parity... argue that historical conditions – notably the 
outcome of the Civil War and the passage of constitutional amendments 
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during the Reconstruction Era – have elevated the federal government in 
general, and federal courts in particular, to a place of prominence over their 
state counterparts.”105  As the quote suggests, the parity doctrines are 
profoundly conservative in nature.106  They stand in direct opposition to 
what Professor Bator referred to as the nationalist theme that federal courts 
“are to be preferred”107  in the adjudication of federal rights.  It is no surprise 
that there is an intense nationalist critique of decisions like Younger.108   
Thus, for conservatives there is a lot at stake, both practically and 
doctrinally, in the parity debate.  Arguments over judicial federalism mirror 
broader arguments about federalism, for example, the equality of state and 
national institutions versus the superiority of the latter.  Professor Bator 
gives a nice example of how the two levels of federalism discourse blend.  
Invoking the classic federalism theme of decentralization, he contends that 
state judges can enrich the discourse over federal constitutional rights by 
bringing to it an emphasis on structural and institutional values.109   
However, their ability to enrich the discourse will be substantially 
diminished if other participants in it view the state judges as political hacks. 
 My goal in this part is not just to remind conservatives of the 
importance of the parity debate, but to link it to today’s debate over the 
effect of politicization on the state judiciaries.  The parity debate has, more 
often than not, come out in a conservative direction.  Perhaps conservatives 
take this for granted.  Yet, decisions like Younger and its progeny110 were 
often hard fought battles.  They represent one of the triumphs of the 
American legal conservatism.  They could be undermined, if not undone, if 
their major premise – the viability and fairness of state courts – were widely 
seen as discredited.  This premise is crucial not only in the context of 
specific decisions such as Younger, or even specific aspects of the parity 
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debate.  It underlies the American judicial order, and the vital role of state 
courts within it.  It is hard to believe that conservatives would take a position 
that threatens that order.   
The parity debate – as well as broader notions of judicial federalism –
hinges on notions of the quality of state courts.  These perceptions are, in 
part, as Professor Bator said, “intuitive.”111  In individual cases, the decision 
about federal interference with state adjudication often turns on whether the 
state system offers a “full and fair opportunity” for the presentation of 
federal claims.112   Of far greater importance is the general perception held 
by federal courts of how a state judicial system operates as a whole. 
Dissenting in Dombrowski v. Pfister113,  Justice Harlan criticized the federal 
intervention in that case as resting upon “the unarticulated assumption that 
state courts will not be as prone as federal courts to vindicate constitutional 
rights promptly and effectively.  Such an assumption should not be indulged 
in the absence of a showing that such is apt to be so in a given case.”  114    
Justice Harlan’s opinion prefigured the emergence of generalized abstention 
doctrines in cases such as Younger.  Perhaps the most explicit statement of 
the importance of general perceptions of state courts is found in Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Stone v. Powell:115
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of the view 
that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate the Fourth 
Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair and 
competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights.  
The argument is that state courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth 
Amendment values through fair application of the rule, and the 
oversight jurisdiction of this Court on certiorari is an inadequate 
safeguard.  The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad 
differences in the respective institutional settings within which federal 
judges and state judges operate.  Despite differences in institutional 
environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional 
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claims of some state judges in the past, we are unwilling to assume 
that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to 
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several 
states.116
 
Thus, at the moment, parity prevails.  However, as the quote from 
Stone indicates, that rests on current perceptions of the state courts.  Those 
perceptions could change.  Professor Bator stated the matter succinctly:  
“When mistrust of the state courts is justified and endemic, federal 
supervision must be strengthened.”117   For him, “If we are fundamentally 
suspicious of the state court system – if the central problem continues to be 
the problem of mistrust – then the ‘full and fair opportunity’ formula will not 
do.”118   Although it arose in the context of federal court interference with 
state administrative proceedings, Gibson v. Berryhil119  is instructive.  There 
were two different types of optometrists in Alabama, but the board that 
regulated the profession was composed of only one group.  In the face of 
abstention arguments, the Supreme Court upheld the propriety of a federal 
court challenge to a pending disciplinary proceeding.  Although the case 
might be viewed as context based, an example of the “full and fair 
opportunity” doctrine, it is clear that the Court saw the board as structurally 
incapable of rendering an unbiased judgment against a class of parties.120
Gibson could be an indication of far broader things to come in the 
context of state judiciaries.  What I have referred to here as the politicization 
phenomenon could lead to generalized mistrust.  It is no coincidence that 
most influential critique of the parity-based doctrines – written thirty years 
ago by Professor Neuborne121 – focuses on the election of state judges as a 
reason for mistrust.122   Current developments could be seen as leading to an 
unfair judiciary: judges who have prejudged cases, and favored litigants 
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based on campaign contributions.  On a deeper level, mistrust can stem from 
erosion of the ideal of the state courts as different from the political 
branches.  Recall that a central goal of the challengers is to have all elections 
treated alike – both because of the commands of the First Amendment and 
the view that judges are policymakers just like legislators.123
 In a remarkable development, four Supreme Court justices recently 
voiced concern about the effects of politicization on state courts.124  They 
noted polling data that show “fear that people will lose trust in the system,” 
and concern that “[c]ampaign contributions and political pressure will make 
judges accountable to politicians and special interest groups instead of the 
law and the Constitution.”125  A core issue is whether the state judiciary can 
protect individual rights.  As we move toward judicial elections that yield 
judges who look like legislators, the question inevitably arises whether those 
judges can protect citizens from those legislators – and the officials who 
execute their laws.  The challengers will have won a pyrrhic victory if their 
litigation successes lead to a state judiciary which the federal judiciary does 
not trust.  Protecting rights might be seen as a relatively small proportion of 
the state courts’ workload, but it is a vitally important one – both 
symbolically and practically. 
The challengers might claim that issues of federal rights will not enter 
into electoral debates.  In White, Justice Scalia referred to the role of state 
courts in shaping state constitutions.126   But constitutional adjudication 
frequently involves both state and federal claims, often closely interwoven.  
The judge who does not want to face the electoral backlash of releasing a 
notorious criminal on a “technicality,” is not likely to take a different 
approach to federal technicalities than to state ones.  It is naïve to assume 
that federal law issues will not play a role in state judicial elections.  The 
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Alabama advertisements discussed earlier brought up enforcement of federal 
court orders on same sex marriage.127   Indeed, one candidate “suggested 
defiance of U.S. Supreme Court precedent…”128 in the criminal law context.  
Questionnaires in Kentucky and North Carolina “asked candidates to agree 
or disagree with the following statement: ‘I believe that Roe v. Wade was 
wrongly decided.’”129    A Kentucky judicial candidate stated his support for 
“having the Ten Commandments in our schools and courthouses…”130
Conservatives have always emphasized the symbolic aspects of 
federalism, rightly so.  This concern also extends to the practical dimensions 
of the parity-based doctrines.  It is not a victory for conservatives if the 
politicized state courts are viewed as hierarchically inferior tribunals whose 
vital operations require federal supervision.  As Solimine and Walker put it, 
the parity decisions are “a challenge to maintain and enhance the quality of 
state judicial systems...”131 Professor Bator also stressed “the importance of 
creating and maintaining conditions that assure that, in the long run, these 
state courts will be respected and equal partners with the lower federal 
courts in the enterprise of formulating and enforcing federal constitutional 
principles...”132   Beyond substantive rights lies the issue of the basic fairness 
of state courts – their ability to provide procedural due process.  From a 
conservative perspective, focusing on these values, it is hard to see 
politicization as anything but a step backward.   
 
B.  From Judicial Federalism to General Federalism – Difference and 
Experimentation 
 
Judicial federalism arguments depend largely on the “justness” of 
state courts and whether they are perceived as equal to the federal courts in 
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quality and potential fairness.  These arguments, however, lead to more 
general considerations of federalism – considerations that depend not so 
much on the link between the quality of state courts and the methods of 
selecting their judges, as on the value of having different methods.  This 
value reflects fundamental aspects of the broader federal system.   
 
1. Difference as a value in itself.  
Professor Steven Calabresi puts the basic case for federalism in these terms:  
 
The opening argument for state power is that social tastes and 
preferences differ, that those differences correlate significantly with 
geography, and that social utility can be maximized if governmental 
units are small enough and powerful enough so that local laws can be 
adapted to local conditions, something the national government, with 
its uniform lawmaking power, is largely unable to do.133
 
“Local laws” surely include those by which a state organizes and 
regulates its governmental organization.  In Gregory v. Ashcroft 134 the 
Supreme Court declared that the manner in which a state organizes itself is 
an important element of how it defines its sovereignty.135  This general 
principle suggests that there might well be several different ways of 
structuring a state judiciary, including the method of its selection.  Professor 
Schotland describes as “striking” the manner in which “the states vary the 
selection systems for their different courts.”136    He identifies fourteen 
varieties of selection methods.137   These include different uses of the 
election technique.138
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 Such a range of differences is obviously an example of federalism in 
operation.  The question then becomes whether the ability to choose the 
election method includes the power to regulate the election in ways to make 
it, for example, more or less political.  In a critique of White, Wendy 
Weisser has argued that attempts to reduce politicization of the election of 
judges are an attempt to create an independent judiciary, in particular, one 
independent of the political branches.139   She answers in the affirmative the 
question whether the state can regulate the election with an eye to 
determining the nature of the institution – the down-the-road question.  For 
her, the Canons, including the one struck down in White, “are part of a 
broader institutional design by which Minnesota defines and controls its 
judiciary.”140
Minnesota’s system of judicial elections cannot be understood apart 
from the carefully crafted constitutional and statutory scheme of 
which it is a part.  The structure and provisions of the state 
constitution all point to the conclusion, recognized by the state’s 
supreme court, that this scheme was designed primarily to preserve 
judicial independence within a structure of separated powers.  Instead 
of using the federal methods of appointment and life tenure, 
Minnesota pursues this ideal through a variety of other mechanisms 
aimed at insulating judges and judicial candidates from political 
pressures.  Over time, and in response [to] the state’s experience, 
Minnesota has tinkered with these mechanisms to better achieve its 
constitutional goal.  The overriding goal, however, has remained the 
establishment of an independent judiciary protected from political 
pressures from both the political branches and the public.141  
 
In other words, states should not only be free to choose to have an elected 
judiciary, but should also be free to decide how to protect it from forces that 
can reasonably be viewed as preventing it from acting in a judicial manner.  
The freedom is not absolute; the First Amendment obviously applies to all 
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elections.  The question is whether federalism and rule of law values argue 
against an absolutist view of the amendment that pushes elected state 
judiciaries toward looking like political branches in derogation of their 
judicial nature.  Federalism suggests that states ought to be able to regulate 
judicial elections so as to “preserve judicial independence within a system of 
separated powers.” 
 
2.  Experimentation – The Laboratory Theory at Work. 
What I present here as the presumptive conservative argument  against 
politicization thus draws strong support from another, closely related, basic 
principle of federalism:  the “laboratory” theory, or the value of 
experimentation.  The very fact that states differ permits them to approach 
problems differently.  The most famous statement of this aspect of 
federalism is Justice Brandeis’:  
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with 
serious consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.142
 
State experimentations in governance obviously have value beyond 
the realm of the “social and economic.”  Indeed, the question of how best to 
regulate election of judges would seem a good example, given its 
importance, controversial nature, and the wide range of opinions on the 
subject.  The point is not just that states can differ from the federal model of 
appointed judges, but that difficult questions of how to accommodate the 
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institution of elected judges with rule of law values argue for states offering 
differing answers.143  An important article by Professor William Marshall on 
campaign finance reform144 provides helpful insights.  Writing at a time of 
great uncertainty over federal campaign finance reform efforts, Marshall 
proposed that “the regulation of campaign finance of federal election matters 
... be devolved to the states.”145   He contended that “if the states are 
experimenting with different types of reform, the problems inherent in 
particular proposals may become apparent more quickly by virtue of 
comparison.”146
There are striking parallels.  Judicial election regulation is a type of 
campaign reform, and clearly related to campaign finance reform.147   
Regulating judicial elections presents the same First Amendment problem 
that the Court’s campaign finance cases have grappled with since Buckley v. 
Valeo.148   One can say of White what Marshall said of Buckley: “The most 
likely benefit to First Amendment concerns is that increased litigation might 
allow the constitutional issues left open as ambiguous in [the case] to 
percolate into a more coherent doctrine.”149   My point is not to argue that 
federalism values trump the First Amendment, but to establish a 
presumption that conservatives (presumably staunch federalists)150 should 
look with favor on states’ efforts to structure their judicial elections, and 
with dismay on the phenomenon of politicization, in particular its effects on 
notions of parity and federalism in general.  
 
3.  Who are the True Federalists in the Judicial Election Debate?  
Those who tend to agree with the argument to this point would 
probably also agree with the following statement:  
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By recognizing a conflict between the demands of electoral politics 
and distinct characteristics of the judiciary, we do not have to put 
States to an all or nothing choice of abandoning judicial elections or 
having elections in which anything goes.151
 
However, it is from Justice Stevens’ dissent in White. The majority saw the 
case as presenting essentially a First Amendment problem.  Once Minnesota 
chose to elect its justices, the Amendment governed the process to the same 
extent it would govern any other election.152   Strict scrutiny allowed little 
room for state regulation of judicial campaigns.  The closest thing to a 
discussion of federalism in the majority’s opinions is found in Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence.153   But it was hardly an endorsement of state 
freedom.  For Justice O’Connor, once the state had chosen to select judges 
through contested elections, it had “voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial 
bias...”154  “If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely 
one the state brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly 
electing judges.”155   In other contexts, Justice O’Connor has been a 
champion of federalism generally, and of the laboratory theory in 
particular.156
A more extensive judicial discussion of federalism concerns is that 
found in the Eighth Circuit’s en banc consideration of two further Minnesota 
Canons in the remand of White from the Supreme Court.157  The court struck 
down both Canons, one of which dealt with partisan activity, and one of 
which dealt with solicitation of campaign contributions.158 The court 
acknowledged the importance of state sovereignty, and recognized that 
“States have wide authority to set up their state and local governments as 
they wish.”159  However, even if viewed as “concurrent,” state sovereignty is 
subject to the Supremacy Clause.160   Thus federal rights can be curtailed as 
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part of the structuring process only if federal constitutional doctrine permits 
it.161   In the case of political speech, protected by the First Amendment, that 
doctrine is strict scrutiny.162
Thus for the challengers, who once again prevailed, the presumption 
against politicization – whether labeled mere policy or policy grounded in 
constitutional values – is trumped by the virtually absolute thrust of the First 
Amendment rights that they see as governing all elections, regardless of the 
office at stake.  To them, it makes no sense for a critic such as Ms. Weisser 
to say that “Unfortunately, the White decision reads as a straightforward 
First Amendment election decision instead of a decision addressing the 
complex interplay between competing constitutional values.”163   For them, 
that is the point.  White was an election case, nothing more.  Even if 
“constitutional values” are somehow present, they do not rise to the level of 
a compelling state interest required by strict scrutiny.  White is obviously the 
centerpiece of the challengers’ offensive.  However, before analyzing the 
case itself, I wish to discuss two important sets of arguments that the 
challengers would regard as sufficient by themselves to rebut the 
presumption that I have tried to establish above.  They would contend that 
White is not necessary to establish that the true conservative position is one 
that favors unfettered speech, and related activities, in judicial elections.  
 
III. Rebutting the Presumption – The Challengers as the True Conservatives 
 A) The Campaign Finance Reform Trap 
 1) Conservatives and Campaign Finance Reform 
 A major theme of conservative legal thought – found in the work of 
both judges and academics – is deep skepticism about proposals for 
campaign finance reform.164   The challengers no doubt view defenders of 
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restrictions on judicial campaigns as falling into what might be called the 
campaign finance reform trap: the view that restricting electoral activities 
protected by the First Amendment can make elections somehow “better.”165   
As a general matter, conservatives have stressed the centrality of First 
Amendment freedoms in the electoral context.166   They frequently cite 
Brown v. Hartlage,167  a decision authored by Justice Brennan, for such 
propositions as “The free exchange of ideas provides special vitality to the 
process at the heart of American constitutional democracy – the political 
campaign.”168   They see reformers as attempting to use the First 
Amendment as a grant of legislative power to achieve political equality by 
limiting the role of wealth in the electoral process.  Professor Lillian BeVier, 
a leading conservative academic, views these efforts as follows: “The 
rejection of the prevailing view that the First Amendment has force merely 
as a negative restraint on government and that government regulation of 
speech is the antithesis of freedom.”169   Professor Allison Hayward sees a 
sharp contrast between a Madisonian “preference for leaving political 
activity free from governmental control,”170 and Progressive “social 
engineering ideals”171 aimed at a “constitutional democracy-enhancing 
purpose.”172   The enhancement would come from elimination of private 
influence based on wealth in the operation of the political system.   
 It is not immediately apparent that regulating  judicial elections 
represents the same type of broad social goals.  Nonetheless, the two forms 
of regulation are linked by a number of themes, including the perceived need 
to circumscribe First Amendment freedoms.173   In the next two sub-
sections, I wish to discuss two of those themes of special interest to 
conservatives:  the risk that reform equals entrenchment; and, the 
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relationship between campaign regulations and the redistribution of political 
power.  
 
 2) Entrenchment 
 A frequent criticism of campaign finance reform proposals is that they 
are designed by incumbent officeholders and will work to entrench 
incumbent officeholders. As Professor BeVier puts it, “protection of 
incumbents tends to be a wolf too readily disguised in the sheep’s clothing 
of reform.”174   Incumbents can “reform” the system in a way that preserves 
the advantages of incumbency while making it harder for challengers to 
overcome them.  Dissenting in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission,175 Justice Scalia outlined the connection between the First 
Amendment and the entrenchment problem.  He first described the “heart” 
of First Amendment protection as “the right to criticize the government.”176   
He then noted that the legislation before the Court (the Bipartisan Campaign 
Act) would operate to limit criticism of incumbents.177   Here is how he 
described the link to the First Amendment:  
 
 To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It similarly prohibits 
criticism of the candidates who oppose Members of Congress in their 
reelection bids.  But as everyone knows, this is an area in which 
evenhandedness is not fairness.  If all electioneering were 
evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous 
advantage.  Likewise, if incumbents and challengers are limited to the 
same quantity of electioneering, incumbents are favored.  In other 
words, any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally 
available to challengers and incumbents tends to favor incumbents.178
 
 How should one apply what Professor BeVier calls the “premise of 
distrust”179 to the network of Canon-based regulations of judicial elections?  
31 
It certainly is reform in the general “good government” sense that one might 
apply to campaign finance reform.  The challengers can draw on 
conservative critiques of the latter to point out serious entrenchment 
problems.  The argument runs as follows. The state canons generally are 
drawn up by members of the local legal establishment, and promulgated by 
the state’s highest court.  Thus, the particular body promulgating them has a 
direct interest in their effect.  Moreover, incumbent judges at all levels, as 
well as state bar insiders have an interest.  These interests are served by low 
visibility elections that favor incumbents and disfavor challengers.  
Preventing politicization, as described earlier in this article, serves this goal 
directly.  Thus state canons are likely to forbid pledges or promises, or 
commitments about how a candidate would decide cases,180 limit candidates’ 
fundraising activities,181  or establish nonpartisan elections.182
Referring to a nonpartisan state canon, the Eighth Circuit stated that 
its fruits “appear to bear witness to its remarkably pro-incumbent 
character.”183   Most observers, whatever their ideological perspective, agree 
on this point.  Professor Chemerinsky, an opponent of the Canons states that 
“Voters rarely know enough about judicial candidates to make a 
knowledgeable choice.”184   Professor Schotland, a supporter, quotes other 
scholars to the effect that, “Traditionally, ‘political campaigns for judicial 
posts [were] as exciting as a game of checkers . . . [p]layed by mail.’ [l]ow-
key affairs conducted with civility and dignity.”185   Writing from a general 
election law perspective, Dean Briffault describes judicial elections as 
“traditionally... low salience events, with low public interest, very low free 
media coverage, and, as a result, low voter turnout.”186   He views this state 
of affairs as burdening challengers.187
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Not surprisingly, conservatives have made the connection between 
campaign reform generally and judicial election reform.  Professor Rotunda 
writes that “White... and its rationale suggest that the Court will be wary of 
campaign reform legislation that is disguised as incumbent protection 
legislation.”188  Conservatives view Canon-based judicial election reforms as 
not only aimed at keeping some people in, but at keeping them out.  
Professor Stern has noted the phenomenon of conservative groups fighting 
restrictions on candidates expressing their views on social issues such as 
abortion and same-sex marriage.189  Candidates, and judges, who get into 
trouble under existing regulations tend to be those who express conservative 
views such as a tough on crime stance.190   To the extent, then, that I have 
posed the question whether the challengers can rebut the presumption 
against politicization posited in Section II, the entrenchment argument that 
conservatives have advanced in the campaign finance context is a point in 
their favor.  
 
3) Judicial Campaign Regulation as Social Engineering 
Another theme of the conservative critique of campaign finance 
reform is that it represents social engineering in at least two respects.  On a 
specific level it represents an attempt to alter the rules governing elections in 
order to achieve “greater democracy,” a more “equal” electoral system.  On 
a general level, reform aims at using this presumed equality to achieve 
governmental policies that are themselves more redistributionist and 
egalitarian in nature.  Professor BeVier notes the reformers’ claim of a 
“basic tension between a private market economy and a modern democratic 
polity,”191 and their assumption of a relationship between “economic 
inequalities” and “political inequalities.”192   Thus proposals for campaign 
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finance reform may, in fact, reflect a basic hostility to free markets and a 
preference for “collectivized” economic decision-making.193 
Certainly, some proponents of campaign finance reform are not shy 
about voicing such views.  According to Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz 
“candidates backed with wealth get a longer and far more respectful hearing 
than those who are not; in government, public policy rapidly comes to reflect 
and reinforce wealth inequalities.”194  They elaborate as follows: 
The systemic degradation of political influence of the nonaffluent is 
best witnessed by government policy. Congress is far more responsive 
to the political interests of the wealthy than the poor, and often acts to 
the detriment of those who do not participate in the wealth primary.  
As political campaign costs and expenditures have soared in the last 
two decades, poor and working class people have steadily lost 
economic ground, while wealthy individuals and corporations have 
been greatly enriched.”195
 
Although such arguments were dealt a serious setback in Buckley v. 
Valeo,196 they are still part of the campaign finance reform debate.197   
Obviously they are anathema to conservatives.  In general, one could 
characterize conservatives as highly supportive of the free market and of the 
notion that resources acquired in that market can be deployed to advance 
one’s political views.  The question is whether the effort to regulate judicial 
elections – here presented as analogous to campaign finance reform – can in 
any way be viewed as an attempt at potentially massive social engineering 
and an attack on the existing socio-economic order.   
At first blush, the answer seems clearly no.  The debate between those 
described here as the reformers and the challengers seems not so much about 
restructuring the democratic process to achieve redistributionist goals in the 
broader society as it seems a debate about how to adapt the imperatives of 
the democratic process – particularly its First Amendment dimensions – to 
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the imperatives of the judicial process.  Thus one could conclude that the 
conservative critique of this dimension of campaign finance reform does not 
carry over to judicial election reform, and does not operate to rebut the 
conservative presumption posited in Section II.  
There is, if anything, a certain amount of conservative 
redistributionism in the challengers’ attacks on the Canon-based system 
backed by the reformers.  They start with the important point that different 
methods of judicial selection will result in different degrees of power over 
the process by participants in it.198   The ultimate result will be the selection 
of judges (and presumably their decisions once on the bench) congruent with 
the views of those who hold the most power.  This sounds like the premise 
of the campaign finance reformers.  However, in the judicial context, the 
challengers appear to be the Robin Hoods.  They see the Canon-based 
system as designed to keep power away from “the lower classes,”199  and to 
make sure that it remains with elites.200
To some extent, this argument parallels the conservative critique of 
campaign finance reform.  It is an argument against entrenchment and a call 
for an open system in which all forces have influence.  However, 
conservatives who were opposed to social engineering in the campaign 
finance context may simply not find it present in the efforts of the judicial 
reformers and the Canon-based system.  Indeed, some conservatives may be 
uncomfortable with the populism of the challengers.  Obviously, as noted 
above, there is no all-embracing definition of “conservative.”  Some who 
wear the label are comfortable with the elitism of the framers.201   In the 
judicial context, other conservatives see more open elections, more 
politicization, as a means of taking back the law and diminishing the role of 
elites.  A recent profile of James Bopp describes his views as follows: 
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“Judges making law according to the values of the people is a good 
thing.”202   Whenever a state has opted for an elected judiciary, the argument 
runs, the elections must be as open as those for any other office.  That is why 
so many of the challengers are conservatives, especially those concerned 
with social issues, who regard the Canon-based system as shutting them out.   
Overall, I do not dispute that conservative opposition to campaign finance 
reform may carry over, to some extent, to judicial campaign reform.  (I am 
referring to policy objections based on calculations of likely winners and 
losers, rather than First Amendment issues.  These are dealt with in my 
analysis of White.)  The entrenchment objection seems stronger than that 
based on social engineering, which is considerably more problematic.  
Putting aside the fact that some conservatives favor some aspects of 
campaign finance reform, I do not think the parallels are sufficiently strong 
to rebut the presumption against politicization.  
 
B) Popular Control over the Judiciary and Conservative Values. 
As suggested above, whatever attempts at social engineering are 
present in the debate over Canon-based regulation may, in fact, be coming 
from conservatives.   The challengers can thus seek to rebut the presumption 
by arguing that politicization of judicial elections leads to greater popular 
control of the judiciary, which advances conservative values.  The argument 
might run as follows:  judges make law; if elected, their elections should 
mirror those of other lawmakers so as to best reflect the popular will.  A true 
reflection of the popular will can be expected to lead to more conservative 
outcomes in such fields as social issues and criminal justice.203  For 
conservatives, these gains ought to outweigh theoretical constructs such as 
judicial federalism.   
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An initial response to this argument is that it is in some tension with 
the doctrine of separation of powers, a staple of both state and federal 
constitutional law.   The contention suggests a blending of the judiciary and 
the political branches rather than a distinction.  Dean Briffault offers the 
following observation on one aspect of the general problem:   
Judicial independence is linked to impartiality since only a judge 
independent of outside pressures can impartially apply law to all the 
parties who appear before her.  But independence also implicates the 
separation of powers and the freedom of the courts from the other 
branches of government... [I]ndependence has been treated as 
particularly important for the courts, as it enables judges to pursue 
their special role in protecting the constitutional rights of minorities 
and vindicating the rule of law even for unpopular parties.  The 
executive and legislative branches have to work together in order for 
government to function as a whole.  But the independence of the 
courts from the assertedly more political branches is essential if courts 
are to apply the rule of law and protect minorities.  As a result, 
although we celebrate the role of political parties in linking up the 
separate houses of a bicameral legislature, the legislature with the 
executive, and the different levels of our federal system to facilitate 
more effective governance, if the parties were comparably effective in 
coordinating the actions of the courts with other branches, the 
capacity of the courts to carry out their duties could be seriously 
undermined.204
 
Obviously, judicial independence extends beyond independence from 
political parties to relations between the courts and the electorate itself.  The 
very concept of an elected judiciary creates a separation of powers 
problem.205 Yet the majority opinion in White seems careful to affirm the 
constitutionality of the elected judiciary.206   Perhaps one should restate the 
challengers’ linking of untrammelled elections to conservative values as a 
theoretical/institutional position after all – a defense of the institution of 
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elected state courts and a desire to maximize their legitimacy.  In this sense, 
the argument is more about theory than about outcomes.   
Certainly, the issue of legitimacy appears frequently in discussions of 
the institution.207 According to Professor Gibson,  
Social scientists have long been concerned with understanding 
the legitimacy of all political institutions but of courts in particular.  
Every institution needs political capital in order to be effective, to get 
its decisions accepted by others and successfully implemented.  Since 
courts are typically thought to be weak institutions – having neither 
the power of the “purse” (control of the treasury) nor the “sword” 
(controls over agents of state coercion) – their political capital must be 
found in resources other than finances and force.  For courts, political 
capital can be indexed by institutional legitimacy. 
Legitimacy Theory is one of the most important frameworks we 
have for understanding the effectiveness of courts in democratic 
societies.  Fortunately, considerable agreement exists among social 
scientists and legal scholars on the major contours of the theory.  For 
instance, most agree that legitimacy is a normative concept, having 
something to do with the right – moral and legal – to make decisions.  
“Authority” is sometimes used as a synonym for legitimacy.  
Institutions perceived to be legitimate are those with a widely 
accepted mandate to render judgments for a political community.  
Basically, when people say that laws are “legitimate,” they mean that 
there is something rightful about the way the laws came about... the 
legitimacy of law rests on the way it comes to be: if that is legitimate, 
then so are the results at least most of the time.208
 
The challengers can argue that they do not seek to undermine the 
legitimacy of state courts.  They would recognize that conservative values 
are furthered by respect for state institutions and a view of them as 
legitimate.  Indeed, they would no doubt agree with the judicial federalism 
argument raised earlier: state courts can best play their role in the 
constitutional scheme if their legitimacy is widely accepted.  For the 
challengers, conservatives should recognize that the legitimacy of elected 
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state courts turns on the openness of the election.  As Justice Scalia stated in 
White, “If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of 
the democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process... the 
First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”209   These contentions are 
certainly one side of the coin, but conservatives should not view them as 
dispositive.  The debate at the core of this Article is not over whether elected 
state court legitimacy is desirable, but rather how to achieve it.  To 
emphasize the other side of the coin, let me quote again from Professor 
Gibson:   
Exposure to legitimizing judicial symbols reinforces the process 
of distinguishing courts from other political institutions.  The message 
of these powerful symbols is that “courts are different,” and owing to 
these differences, courts are worthy of more respect, deference, and 
obedience – in short, legitimacy.  Because courts use non-political 
processes of decision making, and since judicial institutions associate 
themselves with symbols of impartiality and insulation from ordinary 
political pressures, those more exposed to courts come to accept the 
“myth of legality.”  This process of social learning explains why 
citizens who are more aware of and knowledgeable about courts tend 
to adopt less realistic views of how these institutions make decisions 
and operate.  Thus courts profit greatly from the perception that they 
are different from ordinary political institutions.  They are different 
owing primarily to their decision-making processes.  Judges are not 
perceived to be self-interested; rather, they are impartial.  
The threat of politicized judicial campaigns is that 
electioneering may undermine the belief that courts are essentially 
non-political institutions.  Citizens may learn that courts are quite like 
other political institutions if that is the message to which people are 
exposed.  Indeed, this is precisely the most worrisome consequence of 
the politicized style of judicial elections: To the extent that 
campaigning takes on the characteristics of “normal” political 
elections, courts will be seen as not special and different, with the 
consequence that their legitimacy may be undermined.  At the most 
general level, I hypothesize that those who become aware of and 
attuned to campaigns in politicized judicial elections will judge courts 
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and other political institutional similarly, and will therefore extend 
less legitimacy to courts.  Consequently, politicized judicial 
campaigns may seriously disrupt the normal supply of legitimacy by 
portraying judges as nothing more than ordinary politicians.  Thus, the 
general hypothesis of this research is that politicized campaign 
activity undermines the perceived impartiality of judicial 
institutions.210
 
The challengers’ objection to Canon-based regulation may rest on 
such notions as an ABA campaign to subvert the elected judiciary and turn it 
into something like an appointed one (the ABA’s preferred institutional 
approach).211 But, as Professor Gibson’s observations suggest, regulation is 
an effort to save it.  Moreover, it may be the case that judges derive their 
legitimacy more from the office itself – with its particular traditions and 
methods of proceeding – than from its method of selection.  212   Professor 
Gibson points to “legitimizing judicial symbols [that distinguish] courts from 
other political institutions.”213   The wide variety of selection methods – 
Professor Schotland identifies fourteen214 – lends support to the view that 
legitimacy derives from the office itself.  Thus, if conservatives are attracted 
to the presumption against politicization and the view that it depends on 
state courts that are viable and perceived as such, the argument that 
unfettered elections are necessary for legitimacy seems unconvincing at best.   
If the “soft,” theoretical/institutional argument is weak, perhaps one 
should focus on the role of unfettered elections in achieving substantive 
conservative goals.  Such elections are more likely than regulated ones to 
lead to outcomes that reflect these goals. Popular justice will be conservative 
justice.  This is the “strong” argument for rejecting the presumption against 
politicization.  As a starting point, it is helpful to consider what state courts 
do.  In White, Justice Scalia made the following observation:  
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Complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of 
“representative government” might have some truth in those countries 
where judges neither make law themselves nor set aside the laws 
enacted by the legislature.  It is not a true picture of the American 
system.  Not only do state-court judges possess the power to “make” 
common law, but they have the immense power to shape the States’ 
constitutions as well.215
 
This focus on the political role of state courts overlooks one of their core 
functions: adjudicating disputes and hearing appeals from those 
adjudications.   Nonetheless, let us begin with the political dimension in its 
purest form: the making of state common law.  It is here that the challengers’ 
appeal to conservatives is strongest.  Unless one is to attempt to resurrect 
discredited views of oracular judges finding the law,216 it must be conceded 
that there are similarities  between judicial lawmaking, especially its appeal 
to public policy, and legislative lawmaking.  Of course, judicial lawmaking 
takes place in a very different context – resolution of a particular dispute – 
and reflects that difference in many different ways such as adversary 
presentation and the role of precedent.  Still, it can be contended that the 
overall lawmaking enterprise offers enough similarities that the elections for 
both positions ought to be equally open and unfettered – in short, 
democratic, and, if you will, political.    
Popular control over judicial review is considerably more complex.  
As the earlier reference to separation of powers suggests, there is tension 
between this control and the judicial function itself.  If courts are completely 
majoritarian institutions, exactly like legislatures, it will be difficult for them 
to protect minorities against legislative actions that flow from the same 
electoral base.  This is the point of the separation of powers quote from Dean 
Briffault.217   On the other hand, it is perhaps significant that Justice Scalia 
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referred to state constitutions.218   They may already be subject to popular 
control through easy amendment.  In any event, one can regard the interplay 
of forces that shape the making and interpretation of state constitutional law 
as largely a matter for the states, as long as federal norms are not somehow 
violated.219  
It is here, however, that the judicial federalism arguments come into 
play, with a vengeance.  State courts also interpret and apply the federal 
Constitution.  As noted, that is a key part of their role in the constitutional 
plan.  That exercise cannot be subject to the whim of fifty state electorates, 
or any electorate.    There will not always be a dividing line between state and 
federal constitutional rights.  Many claims will rest on both.220  
Any argument for state electoral control over federal constitutional 
law must fail.  Moreover the potential for influence over decisions on federal 
law calls into question the foundational assumption of parity: that state 
courts will consider federal claims within a general framework of openness 
and neutrality similar to that found in federal courts.221   Thus popular 
control is a two-edged sword.  If politicization leads to a widespread 
perception of state judicial hostility toward rights assertion, the federal 
judiciary may well pull back from the parity-based doctrines in order to 
assert a greater rights enforcing role.  In other words, rather than somehow 
reinforcing state courts, politicization could weaken them in a vital area. One 
need not envisage broad-scale nullification-like applications of federal law, 
although inhospitable readings are a distinct possibility, as recent campaign 
suggests.  Rather, it is the adjudicatory function of state courts that could 
play a crucial role in developments in judicial federalism.  Parity relies on 
confidence that there is a “full and fair opportunity” to raise federal claims in 
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state proceedings.222  Trial judges hostile to federal rights have enormous 
power to negate that opportunity. 
One example in this context is the role of federal habeas corpus.  The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996223 is an effort to cut 
back federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.224   It can be seen as 
a congressional adoption of judicially developed parity principles.225  Yet the 
act leaves “a host of interpretative questions...”226  Fact-intensive inquiries 
are frequent.227   Difficult issues arise regarding such matters as equitable 
tolling228 and “structural error.” 229   Obviously, the extent to which the 
federal courts have confidence in the state courts will be a driving force in 
the spirit and scope of habeas review.  A highly politicized state judiciary 
whose members have committed themselves to obtaining convictions is 
likely to receive diminished confidence.  Judicial federalism will be 
undermined.  One can picture an ironic scenario in which unfettered popular 
control leads to more convictions which are then reversed by federal courts.  
It is hard to see how this “advance” in conservative goals does anything to 
rebut the presumption against politicization.  
A further word needs to be said about politicized justice and 
adjudication – the core function of courts, and one which in some 
circumstances, only they can perform.230   Courts make common law, but so 
do legislatures, albeit in very different ways.  They can overrule judicial 
decisions making common law.  Legislatures do not conduct civil trials.  
They cannot pass a law to overturn the result in a civil trial.  To say that the 
legislative and judicial functions are fundamentally different is not to make 
the naïve assertion that courts do not make policy.  The challengers seem to 
assume that any attempt to emphasize the value of neutrality rests on this 
assumption.  Neutrality in adjudication is essential, a point reinforced by the 
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notion of separation of powers.231   Neutrality in the conduct of a trial 
requires a decision maker who is not subject to pressure from the parties, 
and a fortiori from the public at large.232  There is something contrary to this 
ideal in the notion of an adjudicator campaigning on how he or she is going 
to adjudicate.  The existence of political “debts”, especially campaign 
contributions, “owed” to parties who then litigate before the debtor raises the 
same concerns.  Claims have been made in high profile cases that due 
process required recusal when a donor was before a judge.233   The Supreme 
Court has so far declined to review these cases.234   But not so long ago it 
refused to review punitive damages awards challenged on due process 
grounds.235   Now it does.236   Again there is the possibility that federal court 
distrust of politicized state courts will affect relations between the two 
systems.  The notion of popular control over the judiciary raises interesting 
and complex questions.  It is problematic enough that I doubt many 
conservative analysts of the judiciary will see it as sufficiently strong to 
rebut the presumption against politicization.   
C. The Challengers’ Trump Card – An Analysis and Critique of White 
Let us assume that conservative readers agree with the analysis to this 
point: that the conservative policy arguments against regulation do not rebut 
the presumption against politicization.  At this point the challengers can play 
their trump – White – to prove not only that they have a Supreme Court 
precedent, but that the law and policy of the First Amendment are squarely 
on their side.  
1) The Decision. 
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White237 the Supreme Court, by a 
margin of five to four, struck down Minnesota’s Announce Clause.  That 
clause stated that “a candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent 
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judge, [shall not] announce his or her views on political issues.”238   
Although lower courts had narrowed it to “reach only disputed issues, that 
are likely to come before the candidate if he is elected judge,”239 Justice 
Scalia, for the majority, viewed that as a minimal limitation in light of the 
range of legal or political issues that can come before “a judge of an 
American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction.”    240 He emphasized 
the direct bearing of the First Amendment on “speech about the 
qualifications of candidates for public office,”241 and applied strict 
scrutiny.242 Minnesota had advanced preserving the impartiality of its 
judiciary, and the appearance thereof, as compelling state interests.243   
However, Justice Scalia viewed the underlying concept of impartiality as 
undefined.244   He then invoked three possible definitions, and applied First 
Amendment analysis to them.  
He viewed the first, and clearest, meaning of impartial as without bias 
to a party to a proceeding.245   He appeared to accept this concept of 
impartiality as a compelling state interest,246  but viewed the Announce 
Clause as aimed at issues rather than parties.247   Thus it could not be seen as 
narrowly tailored to further any interest against party bias.248   He dismissed 
a second possible reading of impartial as without preconceptions on legal 
views, largely on the ground that judges with no views about the law would 
be unqualified for the office.249 He considered a possible concept of 
impartiality as open-mindedness, but found any measure that focuses on the 
campaign period to be underinclusive since judges and would–be judges 
make statements about the law all the time.250  
The opinion might have stopped here.  However, Justice Scalia 
continued with an in-depth discussion of the applicability of the First 
Amendment to regulation of judicial elections, partly in response to the 
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dissents, and partly, one suspects, to strike a blow against such regulation.  
He invoked cases such as Brown v. Hartlage251 to emphasize the First 
Amendment’s protection of discussion of candidates and issues in an 
election.252 Such discussion is at the “core” of the electoral process.253   He 
disclaimed any implication that “the First Amendment requires campaigns 
for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office,”254 but 
stated that Justice Ginsburg’s dissent “greatly exaggerates the difference 
between judicial and legislative elections.”  255 American state courts do not 
exist in “complete separation” from representative government; they possess 
great power in making common law and shaping state constitutions.256
Justice Scalia finished with a swipe at reformers, such as the ABA, 
who would prefer an appointive system, but, in default, attempt to structure 
systems that do not look like true elections with the protections mandated by 
the First Amendment.257   He closed his analysis with a quote from an earlier 
election case: 
The greater power to dispense with elections altogether does not 
include the lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of 
state-imposed voter ignorance.  If the State chooses to tap the energy 
and the legitimizing power of the democratic process it must accord 
the participants in that process. . . the First Amendment rights that 
attach to their roles.258  
 
In sum, Justice Scalia treated White as a case about elections and the 
First Amendment rather than a case about judicial elections and the First 
Amendment.  This seems clear despite his several disclaimers and 
suggestions that the Amendment might permit “greater regulation of judicial 
election campaigns than legislative election campaigns.”259   The key is not 
just his repeated citation of First Amendment-election cases.  It lies in his 
virtual equation of judicial elections with elections to other political 
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offices,260 and his insistence that the “legitimizing” role of elections requires 
one set of rules. This requirement flows from a focus on how the judiciary is 
chosen and a view that its functions – at the state level – are not all that 
different from those of the (other) political branches.  To view the matter 
this way seriously undercuts any effort to promulgate special rules for 
judicial elections if they raise First Amendment questions.261  In other 
words, White may signal the end of a wide range of reforms, well beyond the 
Announce Clause.262  
While joining the majority opinion, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
wrote separate concurrences.  Each touched obliquely on federalism – an 
issue that the Court ignored – although not in the way that one might expect.  
Justice O’Connor expressed doubts about the elected judiciary as an 
institution.  She noted problems that could arise from judges needing to 
please the electorate and raise money for campaigns, particularly from 
lawyers.263   Minnesota could not, however, attempt to remedy these 
problems through restricting speech.264   “If the State has a problem with 
judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by 
continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.”265   Justice Kennedy 
emphasized the First Amendment aspects of the case, particularly his view 
that the state was attempting to regulate speech based on its content.266   He 
too sounded the theme that the state had chosen to elect its judges.267   
However, he expressed some sympathy for the institution and for efforts to 
regulate it such as a code of conduct or tough recusal standards.   
What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor what the people hear 
as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is most 
likely to be an exemplary judicial officer.  Deciding the relevance of 
candidate speech is the right of voters, not the State.  See Brown v. 
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Hartlage.  The law in question here contradicts the principle that 
unabridged speech is the foundation of political freedom.268  
 
Thus the five “conservative” justices abandoned federalism in favor of other 
goals: perhaps a First Amendment absolutism in the electoral context; 
perhaps an opposition to campaign regulation; perhaps a belief that 
unfettered elections would further conservative outcomes.269
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Souter, 
each authored dissenting opinions.270   Federalism plays some role in their 
analysis.271  However, Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg mainly 
countered the majority’s First Amendment analysis by focusing on the 
unique characteristics of the judicial branch and the relationship between 
those characteristics and political campaigns.  Justice Stevens criticized the 
Court for “obscuring the fundamental difference between campaigns for the 
judiciary and the political branches . . .”272   He emphasized the differences 
between the two types of branches.  Members of the political branches need 
to be “popular,”273 but judges deal with “issues of law and fact [that] should 
not be determined by popular vote.”274   Judges do not serve 
constituencies.275   Since there is a conflict between “the demands of 
electoral politics and the distinct characteristics of the judiciary,”276 states 
need not be put to “an all or nothing choice of abandoning judicial elections 
or having elections in which anything goes.”277
Justice Stevens thus took issue with the majority’s implicit general 
assumption that elections to any office should be governed by the same First 
Amendment standards.  For him, a difference in the nature of the office 
could trigger a difference in the degree of regulation of electoral speech.  
Thus the state could sanction statements that effectively convey the message 
“Vote for me because I believe X, and I will judge cases accordingly.”278   
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He also took issue with the majority’s specific analysis of impartiality.  
Campaign statements touting unbroken records of affirming rape convictions 
“imply a bias in favor of a particular litigant (the prosecution) and against a 
class of litigants (defendants in rape cases).”279   He also addressed the 
Court’s third definition of impartiality: open-mindedness.  He contended that 
statements prohibited by the Announce Clause frequently demonstrate a lack 
of open-mindedness or the appearance thereof.280   Finally, he expressed 
concern that the legitimacy of the judicial branch – which he saw as resting 
on “its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship”281 – could be 
threatened by “electioneering.”282
Justice Ginsburg’s somewhat longer dissent sounded many of the 
same themes.283  She emphasized the nonmajoritarian nature of the judiciary 
– a branch “owing fidelity to no person or party”284 – and the importance of 
maintaining public confidence in the judiciary as a compelling state 
interest.285   There are several aspects of her opinion that take the analysis 
further. 
First, and most importantly, she was more explicit in making the link 
between the nature of the office and the process of election to it.  For her, the 
fact that an election is involved is not the end of First Amendment analysis.  
Cases like Brown v. Hartlage govern “political elections,”286 but they do not 
dictate a “unilocular, ‘an election is an election’ approach.”287  Because of 
the differences between the political and judicial functions – decision of 
individual cases should not depend on a popular will288 – the First 
Amendment permits “an election process geared to the judicial process.”289   
The central premise of this argument is thus that the conduct of the election 
can affect the functioning of the office.  Indeed, Justice Ginsburg goes so far 
as to say that “[t]he ability of the judiciary to discharge its unique role rests 
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to a large degree on the manner in which judges are selected.”290  Thus, 
contrary to Justice Scalia, she would allow a state to regulate its elected 
judiciary to further the goals that the federal government furthers through 
appointment.  
Having taken this analytical step, Justice Ginsburg found the 
Announce Clause aimed at statements that are incompatible with the judicial 
office.291  Moreover, she tied that Clause to Minnesota’s broader system, 
including its Pledges or Promises Clause.292   After White, candidates can 
make pledges or promises by labeling them as announcements of views, 
even though the two are functionally similar.293
A third important feature of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is her extensive 
discussion of the Court’s precedents dealing with judicial due process.294   
Her goal was to show that regulation of judicial elections presents a situation 
where “constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal 
equation.”295   She began with Tumey v. Ohio,296 a case in which a judge had 
a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of cases.297   She argued that 
Tumey had been extended to cases that present a temptation to rule in a 
certain way, a probability of unfairness.298   Party bias cannot be the sole 
issue.  States may enact prophylactic measures to deal with situations such 
as campaign promises that create a probability that a judge will rule a certain 
way.299
Finally, although it was not a major portion of her opinion, Justice 
Ginsburg raised questions of federalism.  She rejected the notion that the 
states should be forced to “choose one role or the other.”300   She saw the 
states as faced with the difficult task of reconciling “the complex and 
competing concerns in this sensitive area.”301   Thus she argued for 
deference to state “experiments” in balancing “the constitutional interests in 
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judicial integrity and free expression within the unique setting of an elected 
judiciary.”302    
2) A Critique of White and the Question of How Broadly to Read It. 
Limited to its facts, White might not seem a major decision.  The 
Announce Clause was regarded as constitutionally vulnerable,303 and was 
not a central feature of Canon-based regulation.304  However, the analysis in 
White indicates a decision of potentially great precedential force.  As 
commentators have pointed out,305 Justice Scalia’s analysis can be read as 
equating judicial elections with other elections to the point that the First 
Amendment applies in the same way in every case.  White may signal the 
downfall of virtually all the Canons.306   Certainly the lower courts, 
particularly the federal courts, have read it broadly.307 
In this subsection I will argue that the challengers’ trump card is not 
as strong as they claim (while admitting that their claims have so far 
generally been successful).  The legal arguments are not sufficiently strong 
to override the presumption against politicization.  The challengers might 
contend that the presumption is only a policy argument308– even if based on 
constitutional values – and that White trumps it precisely because White is a 
decision emphasizing the Constitutional rights of individual candidates.  
However, close analysis suggests that White is seriously flawed and should 
not be read broadly.  Its weaknesses flow not only from the constitutional 
imperative of separation of powers, but also from the due process rights of 
litigants who must appear before elected judges.  Thus there are 
constitutional rights “on both sides of the legal equation.”309  My critique of 
White rests on disagreement with two fundamental premises of the decision.  
The first is that courts, because they make law, are part of “the enterprise of 
‘representative government…”310   Common law courts are certainly 
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engaged in the business of making law and policy.  As Professor Dimino 
argues, anyone who contends otherwise is falling into the trap of magisterial 
visions of the judiciary that have been discredited by legal realism and the 
work of political scientists.311    
However, as argued above, this equation of the judicial with the 
political branches glosses over significant differences between the two.  The 
White dissenters focused on one such difference:  the fact that the 
obligations of office are quite different in the judicial and political branches.  
Legislators are expected to have allegiances and to favor their supporters; 
judges are not.312   Justice Stevens invoked the ideal of a judiciary “owing 
fidelity to no person or party. . .”313 Speech is particularly important in the 
context of election to the political branches because citizens need to hear the 
views of candidates in order to pick a representative.314 We expect, for 
example, legislative candidates to state how they will vote on a pending bill. 
For a judicial candidate to state how he will vote in a pending case would 
seem to enter the forbidden realm of bias.  
Another way to highlight the difference is to focus again on what the 
branches do.  Judges adjudicate.  Legislatures generally do not.  The 
Constitution, to some extent, directly forbids them from adjudicating.  This 
is the role of the ban on bills of attainder, a ban which applies both to the 
states and the federal government.315   The Supreme Court has long adhered 
to the view that “a bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts 
punishment without a judicial trial.”316  Writing for the Court in United 
States v. Lovett,317 Justice Black wrote that the framers “intended to 
safeguard the people of this country from punishment without trial by duly 
constituted courts.”318   Professor Tribe sums up the sometimes complex law 
in this area as follows:   
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Most basic of all, trial by legislature – the use of lawmaking process, 
or of a trial-like process in a lawmaking setting, to inflict punitive 
disabilities on identifiable persons – would be radically incompatible 
with the safeguards provided by trial before a neutral judge and an 
impartial jury . . . . Accordingly, article I forbids passage of any bill of 
attainder by Congress or by State.319
 
The specific prohibition against bills of attainder not only tells us 
what legislators may not do; it reminds us of the special functions of courts.  
They are entrusted with the task of adjudication, in part because of their 
removal from the passions and politics prevalent in legislative bodies.320   
Indeed, the difference between adjudication and legislation is a bedrock 
principle of constitutional and administrative law.  An important early case 
is Londoner v. Denver.321   At issue was a special assessment, including a 
determination of the amount of benefit to individuals.  The Supreme Court 
held that the Due Process Clause required a hearing.322  Yet in Bi-Metallic 
Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization323  the Court held that an 
individualized hearing was not required before a general property tax 
increase.  The Court distinguished Londoner in the following terms, “A 
relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally 
affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had 
a right to a hearing.”324   Justice Holmes, for the Court, noted that in the case 
of general legislative action, groups can bring political power to bear.  
Adjudication is, at least in its generally accepted form, not a test of political 
strength manifested over the decision maker.325   Indeed, the hallmark of an 
adjudication that satisfies due process is a neutral decision maker.326  
Obviously, in the administrative state, many adjudications do not, and need 
not, take place before a court.327 But as long ago as Wiener v. United 
States328 the Supreme Court held that the legislative choice to allocate 
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certain claims to an administrative agency for adjudication “according to 
law” conferred on that agency’s adjudication of them an “intrinsic judicial 
character. . .”329 The agency had to act “on the merits of each claim 
supported by evidence and governing legal considerations,”330 free from 
political influence.331 What is true for agencies is a fortiori true for courts, 
the quintessential adjudicative body.  
If, then, we focus on what courts do, and how they do it, we find 
significant differences between the judicial and political branches.  It is 
helpful to consider three aspects of the judicial function:  common-law 
making, constitutional interpretation, and dispute resolution.332   I have 
conceded some similarity of function in common-law making, although, 
even there, much of a court’s job is adjudication, including law application.  
If the legislative process has been set in motion, particularly at the stage of 
floor debate over new legislation, it seems inaccurate to apply the term law 
application, let alone adjudication.  The processes for making new law in the 
two settings are quite different.  Legislatures engage in logrolling, bargain 
and trade, and extensive interactions with interested persons and groups, 
both in formal and informal settings.  The kind of ex parte contracts that 
would be forbidden in an adjudication are normal, even expected.  
Constitutional interpretation makes the comparison even more problematic.  
If legislation is challenged on constitutional grounds, the underlying 
assumption is that a nonmajoritarian process is being applied to the outcome 
of a majoritarian one.   And if one focuses on adjudication – whether in 
private dispute resolution or cases involving government defendants – the 
difference between the branches appears with the greatest force.333   In sum, 
it is hard to argue with the notion of the judiciary as fundamentally different 
from the political branches.  It seems equally hard to argue that the existence 
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of an elected judiciary erases these fundamental differences, unless one is 
prepared to argue that courts with elected judges represent a different kind of 
judiciary from those with appointed judges.  In each case, they do the same 
things in the same way.  At the risk of sounding “unilocular,”334  I am 
inclined to say that a court is a court.  
However, even if Justice Scalia is wrong in suggesting that courts are 
like legislatures, that does not, by itself, show that elections for the two 
branches can differ insofar as the First Amendment applies.  After all, 
governors perform quite different functions from legislators, but that does 
not justify different First Amendment standards in the context of elections to 
the two offices.  Indeed, this point leads to the second of Justice Scalia’s 
fundamental premises: that the strong First Amendment protections 
enunciated in cases such as Brown v. Hartlage apply in the same way to all 
elections.  The premise is perhaps implicit in White.  Indeed, Justice Scalia 
at first denies relying on it, “[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First 
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as 
those for legislative office.”335   However, he not only proceeds to suggest 
there is no meaningful difference between the two offices – the first premise, 
discussed above – but goes on to make the following categorical statement: 
“If the State chooses to tap the energy and legitimizing power of the 
democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the 
First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”336   The statement is a 
quote from a separate opinion in an earlier election case involving the rights 
of political parties.337   Justice Ginsburg was correct in characterizing his 
opinion as adopting an “election is an election” approach.338
The question then becomes whether this premise is sound.  It has the 
advantages of directness, workability and a privileging of the First 
55 
Amendment.  All of these aspects explain why White has proven to be such a 
powerful precedent.339   Yet that does not make the premise correct.  
Analysis of the problem leads to the conclusion that the Constitution permits 
a state to vary the rules governing an election depending on the office to be 
elected.  This governmental power reaches judicial campaigns and the First 
Amendment rights of those who participate in them.   
In an important study of White and its impact, Dean Richard Briffault 
makes the following general point: “the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
indicated that the constitutional norms governing elections – such as the 
scope of suffrage, the allocation of voting power, and the power to restrict 
campaign finance practices – may vary according to the subject to be put 
before the voters or the powers and responsibilities of the office to be 
filled.”340   Some of the examples he cites are not highly persuasive, notably 
special districts, bond issues, and county government reorganization.341  
However, cases involving the judiciary342 and campaign finance343 are closer 
to the mark. 
One might break the issue down into two separate questions.  The first 
is whether a court, in evaluating an election regulation, can look “down the 
road” at what happens after the election.  One might argue that the state 
cannot reach this stage of behavior through regulation of an election and the 
campaign that precedes it.  Perhaps any such regulation should, at least 
presumptively, be limited to securing the goals of “fair” voting and 
campaign practices.  Thus a state could outlaw vote buying, for example, or 
campaigning within the polling place itself. 344   Such a concern seems to 
have motivated the Eighth Circuit in the remand of White.  An en banc 
majority struck down Minnesota’s partisan activities clause.345    In a key 
passage the majority stated that, “We note that Appellees fret over the kind 
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of influence political parties have not only in elections, but also 
governmental decisions made thereafter. This case, however is not about 
what happens after an election.”346  Dean Briffault, however, views 
Supreme Court doctrine as permitting a state to impose regulations “in light 
of the government actions affected by the election,” and “the differences in 
the dangers posed by the regulated behavior on the public offices… 
determined by the election.”347
The classic example of government’s ability to look down the road is 
the treatment of campaign contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo.348  
Buckley is the foundation of modern campaign finance doctrine.  Despite 
attacks from different sides of the spectrum,349  Buckley appears to retain its 
force.350   The Court upheld a restriction on campaign contributions even 
though there was infringement on First Amendment rights351 that required 
the “closest scrutiny.”352   The core interest advanced in support of limits was 
“the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by 
the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on 
candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.”353
The Court accepted this interest as constitutionally sufficient.  It 
conceded that precise empirical evidence might not be available,354  but held 
that “to the extent that large contributions are given to secure political quid 
pro quos from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our 
system of representative democracy is undermined.”355   Thus the Court 
upheld prophylactic legislation aimed at a down-the-road evil. It is 
particularly important to note that opponents of the contribution limits 
argued that government should be limited to dealing with the evil when it 
occurs.  They invoked bribery laws and disclosure requirements as a less 
restrictive means of dealing with it.356   The invocation of bribery is a form 
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of down the road First Amendment argument:  government should deal with 
corruption when it arises, not through limits on protected activity at the 
campaign stage. The Court rejected the argument, however, and upheld 
clearly prophylactic limits on campaign activity: the giving of 
contributions.357
This leads to a second question:  assuming that down the road analysis 
is appropriate in some contexts, is it appropriate in judicial elections?  Can 
the election, more precisely the campaign, affect the functioning of an 
office?  As Dean Briffault puts it, are there “aspects of the judicial office that 
support greater regulation of judicial elections than elections for the 
legislative and executive branches?”358   Certainly the network of Canon-
based regulation is aimed at preventing campaign behavior – statements, 
political activities, financial dealings with supporters – that could affect, or 
appear to affect, the operation of the judiciary.  It represents what Justice 
Ginsburg called “an election process geared to the judicial office.”359
Courts and commentators have read the majority opinion in White as 
casting serious doubt on any such approach when forced to withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny.360   Yet Justice Scalia’s discussion of party bias points 
the other way.  He suggests that preventing “speech for or against particular 
parties”361 constitutes a compelling state interest.362   There is certainly an 
intuitive appeal to the notion that some campaign speech could threaten due 
process.   
If the appeal of Jones’ rape conviction is pending during the election 
for the State Supreme Court, there would be serious due process problems 
presented by a successful candidate’s statement that “if elected, I will vote to 
uphold the Jones conviction.”  The problem can take more complicated 
forms.  In White, Justice Stevens argued that one cannot always draw a sharp 
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line between bias against particular litigants and bias against a class of 
litigants.363   What about even more difficult scenarios such as a judicial 
candidate who promises to give special credibility to the testimony of law 
enforcement officials?364   It is worth noting that some of White’s strongest 
defenders appear to concede that there are some things that judicial 
candidates may be prevented from saying.365   My point is not to contend for 
the validity of any particular Canon.  Rather, it is to show that judicial 
elections represent a strong case for the state’s ability to take the down the 
road consequences into account in attempting to regulate activities that can 
claim First Amendment protection.  Indeed, they represent the quintessential 
case. 
If, then, one concludes that not all “political” offices are alike, and 
that all elections need not, for First Amendment purposes, be alike.  White’s 
foundations appear as weakened, and its status as a precedential juggernaut 
diminished. While the First Amendment applies, courts should be receptive 
to finding a compelling state interest in broad protection of future litigants’ 
due process rights.366 The concept of avoiding the appearance of unfairness 
certainly deserves more attention than it received in White. Beyond any 
general interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption present in 
campaign contribution cases367 lies the particular importance of public 
perception of the judiciary as fair, unbiased and not tainted by 
prejudgment.368 Conceivably, courts could require a less than compelling 
interest–a First Amendment form of intermediate scrutiny–as campaign 
finance cases have suggested.369  
The arguments behind the presumption against politicization retain 
their force. I have emphasized arguments that appeal to conservatives, in 
part because, as the lineup in White itself suggests, most liberals are already 
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on board in terms of preserving Canon-based regulation.370   An appeal to 
conservatives also makes sense both because they are the driving force 
behind the challengers and because an anti-regulatory stance has inherent 
appeal to them.  My goal is not a 180 degree turn, let alone an abandonment 
of the First Amendment, but a recognition of the complexities of the 
problem and a sympathy for some regulation.  Wherever one stands in the 
overall debate, it must be recognized that White is the guiding precedent.  It 
is the only Supreme Court decision on Canon-based regulation of judicial 
elections.371  The arguments presented above are not aimed at securing its 
overruling – a dubious objective – but at slowing down its snowball effect in 
the lower courts, and at influencing any future Supreme Court consideration 
of the issue.372   In the meantime, life goes on.  Judicial elections will 
continue to be held, particularly since a shift away from them seems highly 
unlikely.373   I will conclude with a brief examination of what they might 
look like in the post-White world. 
IV. The Post-White World 
One can envisage three possible scenarios: a return to the prior system 
of Canon-based regulation; an end to regulation of judicial campaigns other 
than that applicable to political branch offices; and, a second generation of 
rules and practices including (perhaps) some coercive measures, voluntary 
limits on campaign practices and new forms of state involvement in judicial 
elections such as public financing.  The first scenario can be quickly ruled 
out.  White is not going away; the current Court is virtually certain not to 
overrule it.  The question for judges and policymakers is how much 
regulation, if any, is permissible under White, and where to go beyond 
regulation. 
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The second scenario – what the White dissenters referred to as 
“political elections,” 374 or “anything goes”375 is a distinct possibility.  In an 
excellent recent analysis Professor Stern contends that, “efforts to preserve 
potent constraints on judicial campaign speech are overwhelmingly doomed 
to failure.  Whatever the merits of restrictions in the abstract, White has 
nullified their underlying premise: viz., that a state, having chosen to select 
judges through elections, can substantially modify the ordinary operation of 
principles governing political speech.  Rather, White embodies rejection of 
the notion that states can insulate judicial campaign speech from these 
principles.”376   He sees White as a decision of great precedential force, 
emphasizing the following aspects:  the denial of “judicial 
exceptionalism;”377 – the notion that judicial elections should be different 
from other elections – the difficulty that strict scrutiny review poses for any 
regulation;378  the majority’s use of Brown v. Hartlage; – a case with a 
strong thrust against regulation of campaign speech generally – and the 
White  majority’s apparent reluctance to credit the state’s assertion of 
interests in regulating judicial campaign speech.379   Professor Stern also 
places considerable emphasis on “lower courts’ receptiveness to attacks on 
other judicial campaign speech restrictions”  380 after White’s invalidation of 
the Announce Clause.381
For Professor Stern the post-White world is not necessarily a bad 
place.  He views as important the availability of recusal382 as a possible less 
restrictive alternative and thus “a means to avoid infringing on speech and 
conduct ordinarily protected by the First Amendment.383  He also notes the 
classic First Amendment argument, invoked by Justice Kennedy in White,384  
that the remedy for irresponsible speech is “open debate and voters’ 
reactions…”385   This argument has become a cornerstone of conservative 
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attacks on the Canons’ restriction of judicial campaign speech.  Professor 
Dimino, for example, draws on Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Whitney v. 
California386  to argue that “the proper corrective for speech promoting 
improper ideas is ‘more speech’ promoting the proper ideas…”387
Although Professor Stern predicts the fall of the Canons, he is not 
necessarily predicting the arrival of “anything goes.”  He notes that 
“proponents of reform have advanced other means to temper the excesses of 
judicial campaigning and promote the election of worthy judges.”388   These 
“other means” are essentially nonregulatory, in keeping with the dictates of 
White.  I will develop them at length, in the context of the third scenario.  At 
this point, it is important to note that the possibility of self-correction, within 
the White parameters, is an initial justification for the challengers’ position.  
Justice At Stake’s 2006 Report states that “the message” from voters is that 
“if you want to campaign like a politician, maybe you should run for the 
legislature.  At least in the short term, American voters seem to be sending a 
strong message to would-be judges:  tell us why you would be a good judge, 
not about your personal political views.”389   However, this “message” raises 
a number of questions.  After all, we are only at the beginning of the post-
White world.  Is this, presumably salutary, phenomenon short-term only?  
How can contentious, perhaps prejudicial, issues be kept out of judicial 
campaigns?  What about the problem of campaign finance,  particularly 
direct solicitation from lawyers and potential litigants?  Does not self-
correction, ultimately, require a degree of regulation to make it stick? 
This brings us to the third scenario for post-White (and post-Canon) 
“regulation” of judicial campaigns.  It is distinctly possible that a component 
of this new generation will be true regulation.  Some of the existing Canons, 
or something like them, may survive White.  Scholars have differed sharply 
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on the question.  Dean Briffault has suggested that Canons such as those 
dealing with pledges or promises, misrepresentations, personal solicitation of 
contributions, and partisan political activity will survive.  As noted, 
Professor Stern doubts any will survive.  Much depends, obviously, on 
whether one accepts the arguments advanced here for a narrow reading of 
White. 
In this article, I do not discuss specific Canons.  My goal is to analyze 
and influence the conservative position on the general question of regulation 
of judicial campaigns.  It is important to note, however, that the pro-
regulation case is stronger in some areas than others.  Given the nature of the 
judicial office, the solicitation of campaign funds seems particularly 
problematic, and potentially susceptible to regulation. The spectacle of 
judges/candidates raising money from litigants/lawyers who then appear 
before them raises troubling questions about due process for opposing 
parties as well as the general fairness of state courts.  As Dean Briffault 
states, “personal solicitation highlights the dangers of abuse by focusing on 
the potentially coercive nature of the request for contributions aimed at a 
potential donor who has or is likely to have business before the judge 
seeking the contribution.”390
In making this point, Dean Briffault invokes the campaign finance 
case and their emphasis on preventing corruption or its appearance.391   
Although a majority of the Eighth Circuit rejected the applicability of anti-
corruption rationales to judicial elections,392 I think this is too hasty a 
conclusion.  Granted, there is debate within the Supreme Court over the 
breadth of the concept of corruption.393   One could extrapolate from some 
cases a broad view of corruption as unfaithfulness to the “obligation of 
office,”394 to conclude that any incurring of political debts – such as partisan 
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obligations – is a “corruption” of the judicial office.395   However, even if 
one limits corruption to quid pro quo corruption or the appearance 
thereof,396  the area of judicial campaign financing invites regulation.   In 
invoking Buckley, I recognize that many conservatives oppose its pro-
regulatory aspects, particularly if read broadly.397  However, Buckley not 
only remains intact, but is the reference point for most Supreme Court 
analysis of campaign finance reform legislation.398  Reports of its demise399 
are greatly exaggerated.  
The third scenario might also encompass a number of nonregulatory 
measures.    A report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York from the 
Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections400 listed 
such possibilities as “independent commissions to evaluate the qualifications 
of judicial candidates throughout the state,”401 “the creation of a campaign 
ethics and conduct center,”402 the expansion of judicial campaign finance 
disclosure,403 and the establishment of a State-sponsored judicial election 
voter guide.”404   Professor Stern cites the possibility of “conversion of 
mandatory restraints on speech to guidelines that candidates are urged to 
follow.”405
Perhaps most interesting is the sharp increase in focus on public 
financing of judicial campaigns in the post-White world.406  As of this 
writing, bills for public financing of Supreme Court races have been 
introduced in several states.407   North Carolina’s existing system of public 
finance has survived an initial judicial challenge, brought by a conservative 
group.408   New Mexico has recently adopted it.409   There is a good deal of 
irony in the prospect of successful challenges to the Canons, mounted by 
conservatives, leading to widespread adoption of public financing of judicial 
campaigns.  Opposition to public financing has long been a core aspect of 
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conservative views on campaign finance reform.410   Indeed, conservatives 
may feel that the pressures to run as a “clean judicial elections” candidate, to 
adhere to “voluntary” restraints, or respect the rulings of campaign conduct 
committees represent the kind of coercion associated with regulatory 
regimes that they thought White had eliminated.  Once again, the “victory” 
has unintended consequences.   
The notion that judicial elections are different, and should be subject 
to a different set of rules, from elections to the political branches is one that 
won’t go away.  At the same time, White is on the books, and is, along with 
its progeny, the guiding precedent in the area.  Many conservatives regard 
the decision as a great victory.411   My goal in this article is to persuade 
conservatives to at least slow down their assault on the Canons, and take a 
sober second look.  I recognize that we are in the post-White world.  Thus, 
some version of scenarios two or three is where the system is headed.412   
The challengers are likely to be suspicious of the third scenario, particularly 
to the extent they view it as an attempt to re-introduce the pre-White world – 
the first scenario – by the back door.  
If one accepts the arguments – both policy and legal – offered here, 
conservatives ought to favor a strong version of the third scenario: one that 
contains some traditional regulation as well as newer approaches.  I have 
argued that as a matter of law, White need not be read broadly.  I base this 
conclusion not so much on a hopeful reading of the majority’s disclaimer,413  
as on my view of the weakness of its premises.  Much hinges on how one 
assesses the results of politicization.  The challengers appear to view it as an 
unmixed good:  one that furthers the values of the First Amendment while 
advancing conservative goals.  But if the state courts are weakened in their 
ability to do justice in parity with the federal courts, and are so perceived, 
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core conservative values are threatened.  The threat to due process that flows 
from politicization is a threat to judicial federalism – a fundamental building 
block of our constitutional system.  One might even view politicization and 
its consequences as a step towards the ultimate demise of the elected 
judiciary.414  Right now the challengers are winning.  At some point those 
who are inclined to sympathize with them may well be reminded of two 
venerable maxims:  “be careful what you wish for,” and “another such 
victory and I am undone.” 
 
Conclusion 
The American judiciary is undergoing a fundamental transformation, 
at least in the thirty nine states that use elections as some part of their 
judicial selection process.  That process is becoming more politicized, more 
like the rough-and-tumble electoral process for legislative and executive 
offices.  This dramatic change is the result of a breakdown in the existing 
system of campaign regulation based on the ABA Canons. The state 
regulations are an attempt to hold the system in a form of equipoise— 
permitting the election of judges, but limiting campaign conduct that harms 
the judiciary once successful candidates are on the bench.  Their breakdown 
is fueled by the Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, which struck down a state regulation based on the Canons.  White is 
but one of a number of successful challenges to Canon-based regulation.  
Many conservatives think this development is a great victory.  Indeed, 
conservatives are the driving force behind the challenges. In this article, I 
have argued that conservatives should oppose politicization of the state 
judiciaries. It calls into question important tenets about federalism and the 
value of states in achieving the rule of law. For example, judicial federalism 
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rests on fundamental assumptions about the American Constitutional order, 
and the central role of state courts in that order. The widespread acceptance 
of this vision is a victory for conservative principles. One would hardly 
expect conservatives to support a transformation of the state judiciaries that 
undermine that order.  White need not be read as requiring wholesale 
invalidation of Canon-based regulation.  The system need not descend into 
“anything goes.”  That hardly seems a victory worth seeking.  
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71 Judge Carl McGowan referred to “the adversary trial carried on in the sanitized and insulated atmosphere 
of the courthouse.”  He stated that “anyone with experience of both knows that a courtroom differs 
markedly in style and tone from a legislative chamber.”  Cited in JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. 
MERRILL, PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND 
MATERIALS, 5th ed. 571 (2003). 
72 See generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 487 (1991). 
73 MCJC 2007, supra note 5, Canon 4: rule 4.1 A(13).  See also note 332 infra (discussing nonpartisanship 
under Canons). 
74 MCJC 2007, supra note 5, Canon 4: rule 4.1 A(8). 
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75 See Briffault, supra note 2, at 225.  (“Surely, solicitation- - the act of asking for a contribution—raises 
the same dangers of undue influence and the appearance of impropriety as the contribution itself.  Indeed, 
personal solicitation highlights the dangers of abuse by focusing on the potentially coercive nature of the 
request for contributions aimed at a potential donor who has or is likely to have business before the judge 
seeking the contribution.  Personal solicitation thus particularly threatens the appearance of impropriety and 
undermines the appearance of evenhanded treatment essential to the judicial role.”). 
76 Gibson, supra note 48, at 22. 
77 Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections, Final Report to the Chief Judge of the 
State of New York [hereinafter NY Report 2006], appendix E, (Feb. 6, 2006). 
78 National Center for State Courts, How the Public Views the State Courts, 42 (1999). 
79 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 774-775 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (8th Cir. 2005). 
80 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 
2006, at 11. 
81 Id. 
82 NY Report, 2006, supra note 75, at 83; National Center for State Courts, supra note 68, at 2. 
83 See generally JAS Report 2006, supra note 3; JAS Report 2004, supra note 30. 
84 Gibson, supra note 48, at 22. 
85 Nat S. Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 5, (March 2007).  
FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 249 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=967653 (discussing “the reality that ‘people want to elect judges….’”). 
86 Dimino, supra note 3, at 356. 
87 See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
605, 635 (1980-1981). 
88 Gibson, supra note 48, at 28. 
89 White 536 U.S. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
90 Id. at 818. 
91 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416, F.3d at 753 (8th Cir. 2005). 
92 Indeed, those who relied on the Canons may not have been fully aware of the First Amendment 
broadside that was sure to come. 
93 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. 
94 Bator, supra note 85, at 625-29. 
95 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
96 E.g. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
97 See Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) (“While we can assume there is a 
special role for Article III courts in the interpretation and application of federal law in other instances as 
well, we do not for that reason conclude that state courts are a less than adequate forum for resolving 
federal questions.  A doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy of state forums would run counter to basic 
principles of federalism”); cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (noting possibility of federal-law 
based suits against states in state courts). 
98 See e.g. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 347-50 (1975). 
99 See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS, 21-22 (2d. ed. 2003). 
100 This is the case, for example, with Pullman abstention and much Eleventh Amendment litigation. 
101 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
102 Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 536 U.S. 743 (2002); see generally 
George D. Brown, Counterrevolution?—National Criminal Law after Raich, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 976 
(2005) (discussing importance of symbolic dimensions of the new federalism). 
103 ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 265-88 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing constitutional and 
statutory tests for “arising under” determination). 
104 Bator, supra note 85, at 627. 
105 Solimine & Walker, supra note 16, at 223. 
106 Cf. YACKLE, supra note 95, at 23-24. 
107 Bator, supra note 85, at 667. 
108 Solimine & Walker, supra note 16, at 218. 
109 Bator, supra note 85, at 631-34. 
110 E.g. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). 
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111 Bator, supra note 85, at 629. 
112 Id. at 625. 
113 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 498 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1965). 
114 Id. at 499; see also Bator, supra note 85, at 625 (“we are talking, in the case of the injunction action, 
about whether a state judge should be prohibited from adjudicating a proceeding for the enforcement of 
state law and policy, not because there has been a showing that federal defenses to the proceeding will not 
receive a full and fair hearing in the state court, but again because of a general mistrust of the competence 
and sensitivity of state judges.”). 
115 Stone, 428 U.S. 465. 
116 Id. at 493. 
117 Bator, supra note 85 at 635. 
118 Id. at 627. 
119 411 U.S. 564 (1973). 
120 See id. at 579 (“It is sufficiently clear from our cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest in 
legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes.”).  The Court cited Tumey v. Ohio, 271 U.S. 510 
(1927) and Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); both of which are important cases on 
procedural due process within state courts.  It is significant that the Court stated that Ward “indicates that 
the financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey.” Id. at 579. 
121 Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). 
122 See Id. at 1127-28. 
123 See White, 536 U.S. at 784 (noting power of state judges to “make” common law). 
124 F.E.C. v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2657 n.2 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
125 Id.  Because of the extraordinary nature of this commentary by four Supreme Court justices on the 
condition of the state judiciary, it is set forth in its entirety: 
State judicial campaigns have become flush with cash as well, with state supreme court 
candidates raising over $30 million in the 2005-2006 cycle.  Sample et al., The New 
Politics of Judicial Elections 2006, p. 16 (2007), available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf.  In a single 
2004 judicial election in Illinois, the candidates raised a breathtaking $9.3 million, an 
amount the winner called “’obscene.’”  The Justice-elect wondered, “’How can people 
have faith in the system?’” Moyer & Brandenburg, Big Money and Special Interests are 
Warping Judicial Elections, Legal Times, Oct. 9, 2006, p. 50 (quoting Justice Lloyd 
Karmeier of the Illinois Supreme Court).  According to polling data, the fear that people 
will lose trust in the system is well founded.  With respect to judicial elections, a context 
in which the influence of campaign contributions is most troubling, a recent poll of 
business leaders revealed that about four in five thought that campaign contributions have 
at least “some influence” on judges’ decisions, while 90 percent are at least “somewhat 
concerned” that “[c]ampaign contributions and political pressure will make judges 
accountable to politicians and special interest groups instead of the law and the 
Constitution.”  Zogby International, Attitudes and Views of American Business Leaders 
on State Judicial Elections and Political Contributions to Judges 4-5 (May 2007), 
available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report_2007judicial_survey.pdf.  
These four justices are the White dissenters.  Their emphasis is on money, but clearly goes beyond 
it to a general unease with the highly politicized system that White helps bring about.  The WRTL dissent 
may have an element of “we told you so”. 
126 White, 536 U.S. at 784  
127 Elliott, supra note 28. 
128 JAS Report 2006, supra note 3, at 4. 
129 Id., at 30. 
130 Id. 
131 Solimine & Walker, supra note 16, at 253. 
132 Bator, supra note 85, at 627. 
133 Steven G. Calabresi, A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v. 
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 775 (1995). 
134 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463. 
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135 Id. 
136 Schotland, supra note 3, at 10. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 See Weisser, supra note 4, at 655, 664, 668-72, 688-91. 
140 Id. at 664. 
141 Id. at 681. 
142 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 284 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
143 See White, 536 U.S. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting): Schotland, supra note 34 at 81-86 (discussing 
problem of accountability and differing approaches).  
144 William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 335 
(2000). 
145 Id. at 376. 
146 Id. at 380. 
147 Weisser, supra note 4, at 695. 
148 See Weisser, supra note 4, at 695; In the White remand, the 8th Circuit, en banc, divided over the 
relevance of the Supreme Court’s anti-corruption cases.  Compare majority at 416 F.3d at 756 note 8, with 
id. at 769 (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
149 Marshall, supra note 139, at 385 (“Crafting reforms that navigate between competing interests is not 
easy….Finally, the unsettled constitutional law surrounding campaign reform favors experimentation.”). 
150 See generally Fallon, supra note 15. 
151 White, 536 U.S. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 812 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 792. 
153 Id. at 788. 
154 Id. at 792. 
155 Id. 
156 See e.g. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (dispute over medical 
marijuana “exemplifies the role of States as laboratories”). 
157 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 747. 
160 See id. at 747-48; U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
161 See White, 416 F.3d at 747-48. 
162 Id. at 749-50. 
163 Weisser, supra note 4, at 665. 
164 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part); see generally Smith, supra 
note 21. 
165 See Dimino, supra note 3, at 376; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Elections, Campaign Financing, 
and Free Speech, 2 ELECTION L.J. 79 (2003).  Professor Rotunda emphasizes the implications of White for 
campaign finance reform generally. 
166 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
167 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
168 Id. at 53. 
169 Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1258, 1260 (1994); Smith, supra note 21 at 1057 (“Reformers have failed to show why a system of 
campaign finance that has existed throughout the nation’s history must be overturned.  They have failed to 
prove that new, unique circumstances justify infringement of First Amendment rights, or even that these 
infringements will cure the alleged ills.”). 
170 Allison Hayward, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform, 7 The Journal of the Federalist Society 
Practice Groups, Issue 2, 185 (October 2006). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 The campaign finance cases do not play any significant role in White.  However, Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent did discuss such concepts as “the compelling state interest [in] preserving the public’s confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of its judiciary.”  536 U.S. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Such an 
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“appearance” analysis is similar to that found in the campaign finance cases.  See also Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 769-70 (8th Cir. 2005) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (identifying unifying themes 
in campaign finance cases, judicial elections cases, and Hatch Act restrictions on executive branch 
employees). 
174 BeVier, supra note 164, at 1259, 1279. 
175McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
176 Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 249. 
178 Id.  He then analyzed particular features of the legislation that would favor incumbents.  See generally 
Hayward, supra note 147, at 186 (discussing the historical evidence of entrenchment.). 
179 BeVier, supra note 164, at 1279. 
180 MCJC 2007, supra note 5, Canon 4: rule 4.1 A(13). 
181 Id.,  Canon 4: rule 4.1 A(8). 
182Id. , Canon 4: rule 4.1 A(1, 2); Briffault, supra note 2, at 181.  
183  Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d at 758 n.9. (8th Cir. 2003). 
184 Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 753. 
185 Schotland, supra note 3, at 3. 
186 Briffault, supra note 2, at 196. 
187 Id.; see Dimino, supra note 3, at 374-75. 
188 Rotunda, supra note 160, at 89. 
189 Stern, supra note 83, at 27-28. 
190 In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003). 
191 BeVier, supra note 164, at 1260. 
192 Id. (quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 84 (1993)). 
193 BeVier, supra note 164, at 1264. 
194 Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
273, 274 (1993). 
195 Id. at 301. 
196 424 U.S. at 48-49 (“It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the 
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections serves to justify the 
limitation on express advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates imposed by [18 U.S.C.A. § 608]’s 
expenditure ceiling.  But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which 
was designed ‘to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources,’ and ‘to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.’”).
197 It seems clear that such equality considerations played a role in the Vermont campaign finance 
regulation struck down in Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006). 
198 Dimino, supra note 3, at 313 n.76. 
199Id. at 375. 
200 Id. 
201 See id. at 309. 
202 Terry Carter, The Big Bopper, ABA Journal, Nov., 2006, at 30.  The quote is from the author of the 
article; it is not a direct quote from Mr. Bopp. 
203 See Stern, supra note 83, at 20-32. 
204 Briffault, supra note 2 at 199 (punctuation altered). 
205 At most, under this view politicization exacerbates it. 
206 White, 536 U.S. at 782-83 (noting that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “has 
coexisted with the election of judges ever since it was adopted….”). But see id. at 788 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  
207 Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting), (“the legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its 
reputation for impartiality and non-partisanship”); id. at 818 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same). 
208 Gibson, supra note 48, at 6. 
209 White, 536 U.S. 788; see Dimino, supra note 3, at 374. 
210 Gibson, supra note 48, at 6-8. 
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211 See White, 536 U.S. at 787-88 (citing repeated expressions by ABA of preference for merit selection.). 
212 Cf. Weisser, supra note 4, at 672 (emphasizing judicial independence and separation of powers rather 
than any particular selection mechanism). 
213 Gibson, supra note 48, at 7. 
214 Schotland, supra note 3, at 10. 
215 White, 536 U.S. at 784. 
216See Dimino, supra note 3, at 360 (“One would be hard pressed to find any knowledgeable observer who 
believes in the ‘oracular’ theory that judges discover (and do not make) law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
217 See source cited supra note 199. 
218 White, 536 U.S. at 784. 
219 Like Justice Scalia, Prof. Dimino emphasizes the power of state courts over state law.  See Dimino, 
supra note 3, at 359. 
220 This is frequently the case in criminal matters where claims such as an improper search or seizure can be 
based on both the federal and state constitutions. 
221 See supra text accompanying notes 90-118. 
222 Bator, supra note 85, at 625. 
223 28 U.S.C. 509 (1996). 
224 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 99,  at 872-73. 
225 Fallon, supra note 15, at 465-66. 
226 Id.  at 466. 
227 E.g. Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006); Belleque v. Kephart 465 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2006); Knowles v Mirzaynce, 751 USLW 3250 (Nov. 7, 2006) 
(describing petition for certiorari from unpublished 9th Circuit decision of April 10th, 2006). 
228 Belleque v. Dietrich, 75 USLW 3515 (describing petition for certiorari from unpublished opinion by 9th 
Circuit in Dietrich v. Cznriech (sept. 28, 2006)) 
229 See U.S. v. Gonzales-Lopez 2006 75 USLW 1550 (2007) (“Application of the principles described by 
these [habeas] cases has proven to be fertile ground for fundamental disagreements among state and federal 
judges on whether and how to apply harmless-error analysis to violations of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.”). 
230 See infra text accompanying notes 308-313. 
231See supra text accompanying note 197. 
232 Cf. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1289 (1975) (emphasizing 
importance of neutral decision maker). 
233 E.g., Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp, 469 Mich. 883 (Mich., 2003). 
234 E.g., Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 126 S.Ct. 1470 (2006) (denying certiorari)). 
235 E.g., Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
236 See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
237 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
238 Id. at 768. 
239 Id. at 771. 
240 Id. at 773 (quoting Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (C.A.7 1993)). 
241 White, 536 U.S. at 774 (quoting decision of lower court, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
242 White, 536 U.S. at 775 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 
(1989); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982)). 
243 White, 536 U.S. at 775. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 775-76. 
246 Id. at 775.  Justice Scalia described lack of bias concerning parties as the “root meaning” of impartiality. 
247 Id. at 776-77.  In a footnote he conceded Justice Stevens’ point that statements concerning issues such as 
an “unbroken record of affirming convictions for rape” might exhibit a bias against parties.  However, such 
instances would not suffice to meet a requirement of narrow tailoring to serve the interest of preventing 
party bias.  Id. n.7. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 777-78. 
250Id. at 778-79. 
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251456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
252 White, 536 U.S. at 781-82 (citing Eu; Brown; Wood  v. Georgia 370 U.S. 375 (1962)). 
253 White, 536 U.S. at 781 (citing Wood). 
254 Id. at 783. 
255 Id. at 784. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 787-88. 
258 Id. at 788. 
259 Id. at 783. 
260 Id. at 784. 
261 See generally Stern, supra note 83, at 14. 
262 Id. 
263 White, 536 U.S. at 787-92. 
264 Id. at 792. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 794, 795. 
267Id. at 795. 
268Id. at 794. 
269 See generally Fallon, supra note 15 (advancing possibility that conservative justices may, in particular 
cases, be willing to abandon federalism in order to promote substantive goals). 
270 White, 536 U.S. at 797, 803. 
271 See e.g., White 536 U.S. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
272 Id. at 796. 
273 Id. at 798. 
274Id. 
275 Id. at 799. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 800. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 800-01. 
280 Id. at 801-802. 
281 Id. at 802 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 288 U.S. 361 (1989)). 
282 White, 536 U.S. at 802-03.  He quoted at length from an article by an elected judge, Paul J. De Muniz, 
Politicizing State Judicial Elections: a Threat to Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367 
(2002). 
283 White, 536 U.S. at 805(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
284 Id. at 804. 
285 Id. at 817-18. 
286 Id. at 806. 
287 Id. at 805. 
288 Id. at 806. 
289 Id. at 805. 
290 Id. at 804. 
291 Id. at 810-11.  She placed considerable emphasis on the narrowing construction of the clause by the 
courts below, which would exempt general statements of views. 
292Id. at 812-13. 
293 Id. at 819-20. 
294 Id. at 813-17. 
295 Id. at 813 (quoting Shrink, 628 U.S. at 400). 
296 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
297 In Tumey, a local judge received a portion of fines which he levied. 
298 White, 536 U.S. 814-17 (citing, e.g., Ward v. Monroeville 409 U.S. 57 (1972)). 
299 White 536 U.S. at 815-17. 
300 Id. at 821. 
301Id. 
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302 Id. 
303 Stern, supra note 83, at 5. 
304 Id. at 7 (discussing challenges to speech restrictions). 
305 See e.g., Stern, supra note 83; Dimino, supra note 3. 
306 Stern, supra note 83 at 1-2 (“most attempts to curtail judicial candidates’ speech [will] suffer the same 
fate as Minnesota’s announce clause.”). 
307 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 
1312 (11th Cir. 2002). 
308 I do not assume that there is always a clear distinction between legal and policy arguments.  Nonetheless 
I have based my initial presumption largely on what I regard as conservative policy about the legal system. 
309 Shrink, 528 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J. concurring).  Justice Breyer referred to a situation in which there are 
constitutional interests on both sides.  However in judicial elections we are dealing with rights: the 
immediate rights of the candidate and the future due process rights of litigants who must appear before him. 
310 White, 536 U.S. at 784. 
311 Dimino, supra note 3 at 357-67. 
312 E.g., White, 536 U.S. at 803-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
313 Id. at 804. 
314 This is the case even if  the “representative” adopts the view he should express his own views, rather 
than those of the voters. 
315 U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
316 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323 (1866). 
317 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
318 Id. at 317. 
319 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3.d Ed., 641 (2000). 
320 I recognize that this could be an argument against the institution of elected judges generally.  That is 
why the tempering of passion and politics produced by Canon-based regulation is an important contribution 
to the acceptability of the practice.  See Editorial, The Best Judges Business Can Buy, N.Y. Times, Jun. 18, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/opinion/18mon3.html. 
321 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
322 Id. at 381. 
323239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
324 Id. at 446. 
325ALFRED C. AMAN & WILLIAM T. MATYON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 147 (2d ed. 2001) (In the context of 
individualized determinations, as opposed to legislative or rulemaking decisions, “the power of the group to 
protect its interests, or a variety of interests, is no longer a factor.”). 
326 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1289 (1975). 
327 See Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (governing adjudications before administrative 
agencies). 
328 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
329Id. at 355. 
330 Id.  
331 Id. at 355-56. Court was referring to political pressure from one of the other branches. 
332 Obviously, more than one of these aspects can be present in any given case. 
333 I recognize that state courts engage in some broad “public law litigation,” and that such suits are a 
departure from the bi-polar model which I have highlighted.  See Dimino, supra note 2, at 364.  However I 
do not regard such litigation as a major component of the state court workload.  When necessary, this form 
of  litigation channels public participation into such formalized mechanisms as participation by amici and 
enlargement of the scope of the lawsuit, such as adding new parties.  However the system seeks to follow 
the adjudicative rather than the legislative model.  There are, of course, other important differences 
between the judicial and legislative models.  See, e.g., Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 716 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“a legislature, unlike the judiciary…, has no 
obligation to respond to any group’s requests.”).  The point reinforces the notion of a nonpoliticized 
judicial process open to all on an equal basis.  Justice Brennan once stated that “[l]egislators, influenced by 
the passions and exigencies of the moment, the pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of 
business, do not always pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of legislation they enact….”  
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Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 814 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan discussed the 
possibility that James Madison had changed his views on an important issue concerning the Establishment 
Clause.  He contended that Madison’s “later views may not have represented so much a change of mind as 
a change of role, from a Member of Congress engaged in the hurly-burly of legislative activity to a 
detached observer engaged in unpressured reflection.”  For Justice Brennan, “the latter role is precisely the 
one with which this Court is charged….”  Id. 
334 White, 536 U.S. at 815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
335 Id. at 783.  He also viewed the announce clause as under-inclusive, even if greater regulation of judicial 
campaigns is possible.  However, it seems clear from his subsequent analysis that the election law cases are 
not relied on for the sole purpose of dealing with inclusiveness. 
336 Id. at 788. 
337 Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991).  At issue in Renne, was a state constitutional provision prohibiting 
political parties from endorsing candidates for nonpartisan offices. 
338 White, 536 U.S. at 805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
339 See generally Stern, supra note 83. 
340Briffault, supra note 2, at 192. 
341Id. at 188-90. 
342 Id. at 191-92. Dean Briffault discusses the applicability to judicial elections of the one person, one vote 
rule, and the Voting Rights Act. 
343 Id. at 190-91. 
344 The current controversy over fraudulent voting can be seen as an example of such regulation 
345 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).  In addition to the partisan 
activities clause, the decision also struck down the Minnesota Canon prohibiting personal solicitation by 
judicial candidates.  The validity of both Canons had been left unresolved by the Supreme Court decision. 
Post White debates over the interaction between the Canons and the nature of judicial elections appear to 
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